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I. INTRODUCTION
A review of Texas Supreme Court mandamus decisions during the
/ Survey period reflects that mandamus relief is arguably becom-
Sing a less than extraordinary remedy. Finding "no adequate
remedy by appeal" upon a showing of "exceptional circumstances," the
supreme court reviewed a number of orders-including the denial of a
motion for summary judgment-typically not reviewable until after final
judgment.' Despite the court's contention that it did not expand the "no
adequate remedy by appeal" standard of Walker v. Packer,2 a concurring
opinion by Justice Gonzalez suggested overruling Walker v. Packer alto-
gether, while the dissenting Justice Baker charged the court with using
the new "exceptional circumstances" standard to justify the granting of
mandamus relief whenever it "disagrees with the trial court's decision."'3
Also during the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court examined fi-
nality in the summary judgment context, and clarified the requirements
for an appeal by writ of error.4 The court further articulated the proce-
dure for and circumstances under which a party can transfer an appeal in
geographically overlapping appellate districts.5
In keeping with its trend over the past few years, the court continues to
construe the rules of procedure to provide-not deny-relief, and to de-
cide cases on their merits, not procedural technicalities.6 The court fur-
ther reinforced well-established standards for reviewing punitive damages
and DTPA additional damages awards and factual insufficiency points,
1. See, e.g., CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding);
Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681-82 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
2. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
3. CSR, 925 S.W.2d at 598 (Gonzalez, J., concurring), 599 (Baker, J., dissenting).
4. Withem v. Underwood, 922 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc.
v. Central Power & Light Co., 925 S.W.2d 586, 589-91 (Tex. 1996); Continental Airlines,
Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274, 276-77 (Tex. 1996); Park Place Hosp. v. Estate of Milo, 909
S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. 1995).
5. Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 914 S.W.2d 135, 137-38, 140 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
6. Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594 (1996) (per curiam);
Simmons v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 925 S.W.2d 652, 653-54 (Tex. 1996) (per
curiam); Isern v. Ninth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 604, 605-06 (Tex.) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 612 (1996); Stokes v. Aberdeen Ins. Co., 917 S.W.2d
267, 268 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Fetchin v. Meno, 916 S.W.2d 961, 962 (Tex. 1996) (per
curiam); Nueces Canyon Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Central Educ. Agency, 917 S.W.2d
773, 776 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
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while expanding the scope of appellate review of summary judgments.7
II. APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
A. MANDAMUS
1. Orders: "Exceptional Circumstances" Establishing No Adequate
Remedy by Appeal
a. Order Denying Special Appearance
Acknowledging that mandamus does not ordinarily lie from the denial
of a special appearance, the Texas Supreme Court held in CSR Ltd. v.
Link8 that "extraordinary circumstances" may sometimes warrant man-
damus relief.9 In CSR, the Australian corporation CSR made a sale in
Australia of 363 tons of raw asbestos to the Johns-Manville Corpora-
tion.'0 CSR had no contacts whatsoever with Texas, but was sued in
Texas relating to alleged injuries resulting from exposure to CSR asbestos
used to manufacture pipe in the United States." CSR filed a special ap-
pearance, asserting that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over
the company.' 2 The trial court overruled the motion and the court of
appeals denied CSR leave to file its petition for writ of mandamus.' 3
The Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted CSR's petition for writ
of mandamus, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in overrul-
ing the special appearance and that CSR had no adequate remedy by
ordinary appeal.' 4 In its no adequate remedy by appeal analysis, the
court recognized that mere increased cost and delay do not make an ordi-
nary appeal inadequate and, in the typical special appearance denial, "no
circumstances apart from the increased cost and delay of trial and appeal
are present."' 15 However, the court explained, extraordinary situations
may exist in which the denial of a special appearance cannot be ade-
quately remedied on appeal.' 6 The court held that such extraordinary
circumstances existed in CSR.
According to the court, the extraordinary circumstances present in
CSR "stem[med] from the problems inherent in many, if not all, mass tort
cases."'1 7 The mass tort defendant's potential exposure to a large number
of lawsuits places great strain on its resources, creating "considerable
7. Ellis County State Bank v. Keever, 915 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam);
Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623,625 (Tex. 1996); Leonard & Harral Pack-
ing Co. v. Ward, 937 S.W.2d 425, 425 (1996) (per curiam); Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770,
772 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
8. 925 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
9. Id. at 596.
10. Id. at 593-94.
11. Id. at 594-95.
12. Id. at 594.
13. i
14. Id. at 596.
15. Id.





pressure to settle the case, regardless of the underlying merits."'1 8 Addi-
tionally, because mass tort litigation is usually complicated and lengthy,
involving a multitude of parties, a trial on the merits that is subject to
reversal on appeal for lack of personal jurisdiction would "overtax" the
state's judicial resources.19
The court noted that permitting mandamus relief when personal juris-
diction is clearly and completely lacking and exceptional circumstances
exist "is in accord with the approach of other jurisdictions. ' 20 The court,
however, emphasized that it is not relaxing or retreating from "the re-
quirement that relator must show an inadequate remedy by appeal.
21
In a concurring opinion, Justice Gonzalez considered the impact of
CSR on the court's previous decisions in Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v.
Wittig22 and National Industrial Sand Association v. Gibson.2 3 Justice
Gonzalez noted that in Canadian Helicopters, "the Court denied manda-
mus relief to correct the special-appearance ruling," but held that manda-
mus might be available when the "trial court, in denying a special
appearance .... act[s] with such disregard for guiding principles of law
that the harm to the defendant becomes irreparable, exceeding mere in-
creased cost and delay." 24 In contrast, the court in National Industrial
Sand granted mandamus "to correct a denial of a special appearance
when the trial court clearly had no personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant."'2 5 Concluding that the holdings of Canadian Helicopters and Na-
tional Industrial Sand are irreconcilable, Justice Gonzalez suggested
overruling Walker v. Packer,26 and its progeny, including Canadian Heli-
copters, "to the extent they hold that a foreign defendant with no ties to
Texas must make a separate showing of harm before mandamus will issue
to correct an order denying a special appearance. '"27
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Baker argued that CSR had not met its
"heavy burden of showing irreparable harm."'28 He maintained that CSR
18. Id.
19. Id. at 597. Specifically, the court stated that "[blecause of the size and complexity
of the asbestos litigation, the most prudent use of judicial resources in this case is to permit
a preliminary resolution of the fundamental issue of personal jurisdiction by writ of man-
damus." Id.
20. Id. (citing United States v. Superior Court, 697 P.2d 658, 662 (Ariz. 1985), Lupo v.
Lineberger, 855 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Ark. 1993), Conn v. ITT" Aetna Fin. Co., 252 A.2d 184,
188 (R.I. 1969), State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner, 656 N.E.2d 1288, 1292 (Ohio 1995)).
21. CSR, 925 S.W.2d at 597 ("While the question of personal jurisdiction is remediable
by appeal in most cases .... under the circumstances of this case, the concerns of judicial
efficiency in mass tort litigation combined with the magnitude of the potential risk for mass
tort actions against the defendant makes ordinary appeal inadequate.").
22. 876 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding); CSR, 925 S.W.2d at 598 (Gonzalez,
J., concurring).
23. 897 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding); CSR, 925 S.W.2d at 598 (Gonzalez,
J., concurring).
24. CSR, 925 S.W.2d at 598 (quoting Canadian Helicopters, 876 S.W.2d at 308-09).
25. Id. (citing National Indus. Sand, 897 S.W.2d at 776).
26. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
27. CSR, 925 S.W.2d at 598-99.
28. Id. at 600 (Baker, J., dissenting).
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failed to show that the denial of its special appearance would "compro-
mise its ability to defend the underlying suit on the merits," thus resulting
in irreparable harm.29 He further asserted that permitting mandamus re-
view of the denial of a special appearance constitutes an improper judicial
revision of Rule 120a(4) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure because
Rule 120a(4) implicitly provides that ordinary appeal is the sole remedy
for the denial of a special appearance. 30 Any change to Rule 120a to
allow interlocutory appeal of an order on defendant's special appearance,
he argued, "should be accomplished through the State Bar Rules Com-
mittee and in conjunction with the Court's rule-making authority" or leg-
islative enactment, "not by case law mandate."'31
b. Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment Requesting
Dismissal of Claims Implicating First Amendment Rights
Until the supreme court's decision in Tilton v. Marshall,32 mandamus
relief was never available to correct the denial of summary judgment.33
In Tilton, the plaintiffs consisted of a group of people who had made
monetary contributions to Robert Tilton's ministries. The plaintiffs sued
Tilton for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on his alleged
breach of promises to "read, touch, and pray" over prayer requests sent
to him by the plaintiffs, and for his allegedly insincere religious represen-
tations that the plaintiffs' prayers would be answered.3 4 After Tilton un-
successfully sought dismissal by summary judgment of the plaintiffs'
claims, he filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the supreme court,
challenging the denial of summary judgment.35
Without specifically mentioning the procedural posture of the case,36
the supreme court held that the trial court abused its discretion in refus-
ing to dismiss the claims against Tilton. The court held that the First
Amendment prohibits courts from determining the veracity of religious
tenets.37 An adjudication of the plaintiffs' claims of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, the court concluded, "would necessarily require an
inquiry into the truth or falsity of [Tilton's] religious beliefs that is forbid-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 601. Rule 120a(4) provides:
If the court sustains the objection to jurisdiction, an appropriate order shall
be entered. If the objection to jurisdiction is overruled, the objecting party
may thereafter appear generally for any purpose. Any such special appear-
ance or such general appearance shall not be deemed a waiver of the objec-
tion to jurisdiction when the objecting party or subject matter is not
amenable to process issued by the courts of this State.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a(4).
31. CSR, 925 S.W.2d at 601.
32. 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
33. Id. at 695 (Enoch, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 681.
35. Id. at 676.
36. Only the dissent overtly acknowledged that the mandamus in Tilton was issued to
correct the denial of summary judgment, and that the supreme court had never before
issued a mandamus in this context. Id. at 695 (Enoch, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 679.
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den by the Constitution. '38
Notably, the court maintained that it did not grant mandamus relief to
Tilton merely because the plaintiffs could not prevail on certain claims. 39
Mandamus relief, the court reiterated, is an "'extraordinary' remedy, re-
served for 'manifest and urgent necessity,' . .. and will not issue unless
relator satisfies a heavy burden of establishing 'compelling circum-
stances.' 40 The court found that Tilton met this "high burden of proof"
because his petition raised important issues related to constitutional pro-
tections afforded by the First Amendment "which an appeal cannot ade-
quately protect."'41 In addition to the imposition of an adverse judgment,
the court held that the trial itself "would violate relator's constitutional
rights." 42
While acknowledging that the trial court should have granted summary
judgment, the dissent heartily disagreed with the supreme court's deci-
sion to correct the error by mandamus, and speculated that the court's
decision to do so "must certainly leave the parties and trial court slack-
jawed."'43 The dissent argued that the majority opinion lays a "minefield"
for the trial court, requiring it to "try only certain limited claims of fraud
and not others, to admit evidence only pertinent to those limited claims,
and even then for limited purposes only, and to ensure that Tilton's free
exercise rights" would never be implicated.4 4 The dissent further pointed
out that the court's decision-without explanation-overrules Bell Heli-
copter Textron, Inc. v. Walker,45 in which the court held that the denial of
a plea to the jurisdiction is not reviewable by mandamus.4 6 According to
the dissent, however, the most significant problem with the majority's
opinion is its justification for granting mandamus relief-the implication
"that the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion is more im-
portant than other constitutional rights."
47
c. Order Compelling Production of Irrelevant, Highly Sensitive and
Personal Documents
In Tilton, Tilton also sought mandamus relief from the trial court order
directing him to produce his tithing records.48 Finding the documents ir-
relevant, the supreme court conditionally granted the writ of manda-
38. Id. at 682.
39. Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 681.
40. Id. at 681-82 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 121(a)(2)(D); Holloway v. Fifth Court of Ap-
peals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex. 1989); Canadian Helicopters, Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d
304, 306 (Tex. 1994); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 n.9 (Tex. 1992)).
41. Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 682.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 695 (Enoch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Baker, J.
and Cornyn, J.).
44. Id.
45. 787 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. 1990).
46. Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 695.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 682.
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mus. 49 In doing so, however, the court acknowledged that a discovery
order mandating the disclosure of irrelevant (as opposed to privileged)
documents "does not normally satisfy this standard for mandamus re-
lief."50 The court concluded, however, that mandamus was appropriate
because the discovery order imposed on Tilton a burden "far out of pro-
portion to any benefit that may obtain to the requesting party," and in-
vaded Tilton's privacy.51
d. Order Granting Temporary Injunction in Case Involving
Constitutional Rights
In Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz,52 the supreme court showed its
willingness to review by mandamus a trial court's grant of a temporary
injunction order, despite the right to an immediate accelerated interlocu-
tory appeal.53 In Dietz, just six days prior to the beginning of the 1996
Republican Party of Texas Convention, the trial court issued a temporary
injunction prohibiting the Party from refusing to provide a booth at the
Convention to the Log Cabin Republicans, a group supporting equal civil
rights for gays and lesbians.54 Two days prior to the beginning of the
Convention, the Republican Party filed in the supreme court a motion for
leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus, a petition for writ of manda-
mus, and an emergency motion to stay the trial court's temporary injunc-
49. Id. at 682-83.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 683 (quoting Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843). In deciding that the request in-
vaded Tilton's privacy, the court analogized the request to a request for tax returns, which
the court previously held to be discoverable only if the need for production outweighs
protection of the litigant's privacy. Id. (citing Crane v. Tunks, 328 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1959);
Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. 1962); Hall v. Lawlis, 907 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.
1995)).
52. 924 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
53. Id. at 932. Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits
an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction, and the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure mandate acceleration of such an interlocutory appeal. TEX.
R. App. P. 42; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(4) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
Section 51.014 provides, in relevant part: "A person may appeal from an interlocutory
order of a district court, county court at law, or county court that... (4) grants or refuses a
temporary injunction or grants or overrules a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction as
provided by Chapter 65." TEX. Civ. PR¢c. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(4) (Vernon Supp.
1997). Rule 42 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Mandatory Acceleration.
(1) Appeals from interlocutory orders (when allowed by law) shall be
accelerated....
(3) In all accelerated appeals from interlocutory orders and in quo warranto
proceedings, the bond, or the notice or affidavit in lieu thereof, shall be filed,
or the deposit in lieu of bond shall be made, within twenty days after thejudgment or order is signed.
TEX. R. App. P. 42.
54. Republican Party, 924 S.W.2d at 932.
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tion order.55 In addition to expediting consideration of the case,56 staying
the trial court's temporary injunction order, and granting the Republican
Party's motion for leave within two days of the filing of the motion, the
supreme court also tentatively determined that mandamus relief was ap-
propriate. 57 The court justified the tentative grant of mandamus relief
because of the "statewide importance of the constitutional issues" in the
case and the "unique and compelling circumstances. '58
e. Order Requiring One Party to Advance the Litigation Costs and
Attorneys' Fees of the Opposition
As seen in the supreme court's conditional grant of mandamus in Trav-
elers Indemnity Co. v. Mayfield,59 unusual circumstances may impact the
adequacy of remedy by appeal analysis. In the workers' compensation
suit underlying the mandamus proceeding in Travelers, the trial court ap-
pointed an attorney for the plaintiff and ordered the defendant, the work-
ers' compensation carrier for the plaintiffs' employer, to pay the fees of
the plaintiffs' appointed attorney on a monthly basis throughout the liti-
gation. 60 Conditionally granting mandamus, the supreme court held that
the trial court's actions constituted an abuse of discretion.61 The court
further held that the carrier had no adequate remedy by appeal. 62
In determining that the carrier had no adequate remedy by appeal, the
supreme court acknowledged that a party normally has an adequate rem-
edy by appeal when the trial court improperly orders it to pay the oppos-
ing party's attorneys' fees as a sanction.63 But this case, the court held,
"is different ... the trial court did not merely require [the defendant] to
pay an isolated attorney's fee as a sanction."64 Rather, the court required
the defendant to fund, on a monthly basis, all of the plaintiffs' attorneys'
fees throughout the litigation. 65 According to the supreme court, this
would so "radically skew[ ]" the procedural dynamics of the case that any
subsequent remedy by appeal would be inadequate. 66 Specifically, the
party receiving the "free ride" under such circumstances "has little incen-
tive to resolve the dispute economically and efficiently," while the party
55. Id.
56. Id. The Log Cabin Republicans filed a response the day after the Republican
party filed its motion for leave; the supreme court heard oral argument the following day.
Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 932, 933.
59. 923 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
60. Id. at 592.
61. Id. at 593-94.
62. Id. at 594-95.
63. Id. (citing Street v. Second Court of Appeals, 715 S.W.2d 638, 639-40 (Tex. 1986)).
The fact that the party ordered to pay such fees may be unable to collect them in the event
of reversal of the trial court's order on regular appeal does not render the appellate rem-
edy inadequate. Street, 715 S.W.2d at 639-40.
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bearing the expenses "will be unfairly hindered, knowing that at each
step, whether it be trial, a hearing, a deposition, or the issuance of written
discovery, it must bear the expenses of both sides." 67 In so concluding,
the court relied on its prior decisions holding that a party's remedy by
appeal is inadequate where the trial court's error "vitiates or severely
compromises a party's ability to present a viable claim or defense. '68
Calling the circumstances of the fee order in Travelers "unusual," the
court held regular appeal inadequate. 69
Justice Baker (joined by Justices Cornyn and Spector) dissented, stat-
ing that "[o]nce again, the Court ignores previously well-established man-
damus standards and awards extraordinary relief because it simply
disagrees with the trial court's ruling."'70 Pointing out that neither the
defendant nor the majority disputed that the defendant could challenge
the trial court's order on regular appeal, the dissent asserted that manda-
mus was issued in this case because the majority "simply thinks the trial
court acted outside its discretion and that a quick fix is deserved."'71
"This," the dissent urged, "is not enough for mandamus. '72
f. Appellate Court Order Refusing to Abate Appeal Pending
Resolution of Suit to Enforce Settlement Agreement
According to the supreme court, a court of appeals' refusal to abate an
appeal pending resolution of a lawsuit filed to enforce a settlement agree-
ment is sufficiently "unusual" to warrant mandamus relief.73 The Dallas
Court of Appeals ordered the parties, Mantas and Barnett, to mediation,
which was successful.74 However, after mediation but before any settle-
ment documents were filed with the court of appeals, Barnett withdrew
his consent to the settlement.75 To enforce the settlement agreement,
Mantas filed a separate lawsuit in district court and asked the court of
appeals to abate the appeal until the enforcement suit was resolved.76
The court of appeals refused.77
Finding the circumstances of the case "unusual," the supreme court
held that Mantas lacked an adequate remedy by appeal regarding the
abatement issue.78 The supreme court reasoned that if the district court
ultimately upheld the settlement agreement, Mantas would have lost
much of the settlement's benefit if required to expend time and resources
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)).
69. Travelers, 923 S.W.2d at 595 (citing TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell,
811 S.W.2d 913, 919 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding)).
70. Id. (Baker, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Mantas v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceed-
ing) (per curiam).
74. Id. at 657-58.
75. Id. at 658.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 659.
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in prosecuting the appeal.79 The court also found that "the court of ap-
peals did abuse its discretion by refusing to abate the appeal pending res-
olution of the enforcement suit."8 0 The court reasoned that it "makes no
sense for the court of appeals to expend its resources, and require the
parties to expend theirs, on an appeal which may be moot. '81 The court
also noted that "needless uncertainty" and confusion would result from a
ruling on the merits of the appeal before the rendering of judgment in the
enforcement suit.82
g. Appellate Court Order Setting Aside Trial Court Order
Permitting Reduced Supersedeas Bond
Isern, the real party in interest in the original proceeding in Isern v.
Ninth Court of Appeals,83 was financially unable to post the $3.1 million
needed to supersede execution of the judgment against him in the under-
lying personal injury case.84 On Isern's request, the trial court issued an
order permitting him to post alternate security in an amount less than the
full amount of the judgment.85 The court of appeals granted the plain-
tiffs' request for mandamus relief and set aside the trial court's order.86
But the supreme court found that the court of appeals abused its discre-
tion by disturbing the trial court's order.87 The court reasoned that "no
adequate remedy by appeal exists because, absent immediate relief, de-
fendant Isern [could not] supersede execution of the judgment. '8 8 Grant-
ing mandamus relief, the supreme court concluded that "[t]he threat of
execution on the judgment is a situation of manifest and urgent necessity
which renders any remedy by appeal inadequate. '89
79. Id.
80. Id. The supreme court held that the court of appeals, however, did not abuse its
discretion in denying Manta's initial request to enforce the settlement agreement. Id. The
court relied on its opinion in Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1995), which held
that although a written settlement agreement may be enforced even if one party withdraws
consent before judgment is rendered on the agreement, "[w]here consent is lacking .... a
court may not render an agreed judgment on the settlement agreement, but rather may
enforce it only as a written contract." Mantas, 925 S.W.2d at 658 (citing Padilla, 907
S.W.2d at 462). Mantas, therefore, was required to pursue a separate breach of contract
claim in a separate lawsuit to enforce the settlement agreement. Id. at 658-59.
81. Id. at 659.
82. Id.
83. 925 S.W.2d 604 (Tex.) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 612
(1996).




88. Id. at 606.
89. Id. (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840-43 (Tex. 1992)).
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2. Orders: Other Circumstances Establishing No Adequate Remedy by
Appeal
a. Disqualification Orders
By its own admission, the Texas Supreme Court has granted mandamus
in a number of disqualification cases without explaining how or why rela-
tors in such cases have no adequate remedy by appeal. 90 For example, in
Mendoza v. Eighth Court of Appeals,91 the parents of a deceased em-
ployee brought a wrongful death action against the deceased's employer.
The employer defendant subsequently moved for the imposition of sanc-
tions and the disqualification of the plaintiffs' lawyer, both of which the
trial court denied. The employer then petitioned for a writ of mandamus,
which was conditionally granted by the court of appeals. Plaintiffs' coun-
sel then petitioned the supreme court for a writ of mandamus. 92 On re-
view, the supreme court stated, without explanation, that "[a] party
usually does not have an adequate remedy by appeal if its counsel is
disqualified." 93
In an effort to clarify its reasoning on this issue, the supreme court
held, in National Medical Enterprises v. Godbey94 (NME) that the lack of
an adequate remedy by appeal in disqualification cases is "obvious[ ]."95
According to the court, the "injury to the legal profession from represen-
tation by lawyers who are disqualified cannot be cured by appeal. '96
Moreover, the fact that the order denying the motion to disqualify could
be severed from the pending case and made final for appeal does not
preclude review by mandamus.97 According to the court, although an
appeal from a severed, and therefore final, order would not be inappro-
priate, "that relief can also be obtained by mandamus."98 In cases like
NME, the court concluded, a party seeking disqualification based on the
potential disclosure of confidential information in a pending lawsuit "is
not required to simply hope that the pending case is concluded without
90. National Medical Enters. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 133 (Tex. 1996) (orig. pro-
ceeding) ("In the several cases in which we have granted mandamus relief to disqualify
counsel we have not addressed the prerequisite that relief by appeal be inadequate.") (cit-
ing Texaco, Inc. v. Garcia, 891 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding); Henderson
v. Floyd, 891 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Grant v. Thir-
teenth Court of Appeals, 888 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam);
Mauze v. Curry, 861 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)).
91. 917 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
92. Id. at 789.
93. Id. at 789-90. The supreme court in Mendoza held that the court of appeals abused
its discretion in issuing a writ of mandamus ordering the disqualification of plaintiffs' coun-
sel because the evidence relating to disqualification was conflicting and the trial court re-
solved the conflict in favor of counsel for the plaintiff. Id. The supreme court held that the
trial court's factual determinations "may not be disturbed by mandamus review." Id.
94. 924 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
95. Id. at 133.
96. Id. Moreover, the possibility of a criminal investigation of the party seeking dis-
qualification as a result of disclosed confidences in the pending matter plainly could not be
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disclosure of its confidences . .. ."99
b. Order Denying Arbitration
A party who is erroneously denied the right to arbitration "has no ade-
quate remedy at law because the fundamental purpose of arbitration-to
provide a rapid, less expensive alternative to traditional litigation-would
be defeated."' 100 In Prudential Securities, Inc. v. Marshall, defendants,
Prudential Securities and individual employees of Prudential Securities,
sought arbitration of libel and slander claims asserted against them by
two former stockbroker employees. 10 The arbitration clause reflected an
agreement to arbitrate "[a]ny controversy between [the parties] arising
out of the employment or termination of employment of [the stock bro-
ker employee] .... -1o2 The former employees alleged that Prudential
Securities and the individual defendants "conspired to blackball them
99. Id. In NME, the supreme court granted mandamus to require the trial court to
disqualify the law firm of Baker & Botts, which was counsel for the plaintiffs-a group of
former patients at psychiatric hospitals operated by defendant NME. Id. at 125. In addi-
tion to NME's motion to disqualify Baker & Botts, NME's former hospital administrator,
Cronen, who was not a party to the lawsuit, intervened and filed his own motion to disqual-
ify the firm. Id. at 126. The motions to disqualify rested on Baker & Botts' prior represen-
tation of Cronen in a criminal investigation of NME and its employees. Id. at 125-26. The
allegations underlying the criminal investigation were substantially similar to the patients'
allegations in the lawsuit against NME. Id. In the prior criminal investigation in which
Baker & Botts' represented Cronen, the attorney at Baker & Botts received confidential
information not only from Cronen but also from NME during conferences and meetings at
which a joint defense was discussed. Id. at 125. The evidence reflected, however, that the
Baker & Botts attorney representing Cronen did not gain substantial confidential knowl-
edge and did not share it with the other lawyers at Baker & Botts. Id.
In analyzing the motions under Rule 1.09 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct, the trial court considered the meaning of "direct adversity" and concluded that,
under the facts of the case, no direct adversity existed because "Baker & Botts' independ-
ent judgment on behalf of plaintiffs and Baker & Botts' ability or willingness to consider,
recommend or carry out a course of action will not be and is not reasonably likely to be
adversely affected by Baker & Botts' prior representation of, or responsibilities to, Mr.
Cronen .... NME, 924 S.W.2d at 128 (emphasis added). The trial court concluded that
there was "'no reasonable probability that Baker & Botts would knowingly or unknow-
ingly' disclose confidential information in the course of its representation of the plaintiffs
in the pending case." Id. at 131.
Conditionally granting mandamus, the supreme court held that, irrespective of the evi-
dence, because the Baker & Botts attorney that represented Cronen in the criminal investi-
gation had obtained confidential information from NME's counsel in the joint defense-
and the evidence was undisputed that he had-he could not represent the plaintiffs in the
pending lawsuit as a matter of law. Id. at 129. Because he could not represent the plain-
tiffs as a matter of law, neither could Baker & Botts. Id. at 131.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's application of the law relating to disqualifica-
tion, and further accused the court of reaching its decision in the case by reweighing the
evidence "contrary to the established standard of review in a mandamus case." Id. at 134-
38 (Baker, J., dissenting). In response, the majority denied that it reweighed the evidence,
pointing out that "one can disagree about the legal conclusions to be drawn from certain
facts without disagreeing about the facts themselves." Id. at 133. "Our conclusions," the
court held, "are based on the evidence and findings, not despite them." Id.
100. Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam).
101. Id. at 897.
102. Id.
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from the brokerage industry," and that the individual defendants had
made several libelous or slanderous statements while acting in the course
and scope of their employment for Prudential. 10 3
Prudential and the individual defendants sought to compel arbitration
of the plaintiffs' claim, arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act' °4 and
the Texas General Arbitration Act10 5 required the trial court to enforce
the arbitration agreement. 10 6 Noting that under the Federal Arbitration
Act, "any doubts as to whether [plaintiffs'] claims fall within the scope of
the agreement must be resolved in favor of arbitration,"'1 7 the supreme
court held that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to compel
arbitration because the plaintiffs' factual allegations established that the
claims fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement. 10 8
Later in the Survey period, the supreme court again reaffirmed that a
party who is erroneously denied the right to arbitrate under the Federal
Arbitration Act "has no adequate remedy at law and mandamus relief is
appropriate." 109
c. Probate Court Order Refusing to Release Probate Assets
In D'Unger v. De Pena,1" 0 the supreme court granted mandamus relief
to correct a probate court's abuse of discretion in refusing to release pro-
bate assets to an independent executor who replaced the court-appointed
dependent administrator. 1 ' The court concluded that the independent
executor in the case had no adequate remedy by appeal because "the
Probate Code affords no mechanism for appellate relief."1 2
103. Id.
104. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970).
105. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 171 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
106. Prudential, 909 S.W.2d at 897.
107. Id. at 899 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
108. Id. Notably, the supreme court focused only on the relator's argument that, under
the Federal Arbitration Act, the claims fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
This is consistent with the supreme court's prior decisions refusing to review by mandamus
arbitrability complaints asserted under the Texas General Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Jack
B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). The court's
refusal to review such complaints by mandamus is based on the rationale that litigants
complaining of the trial court's refusal to order arbitration have an adequate remedy by
appeal as a result of their statutory right to an immediate, accelerated interlocutory appeal
under the Texas Act. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 238-2(A) (Vernon Supp. 1995); see
Jack B. Anglin Co., 842 S.W.2d at 271 n.10.
109. Cantella & Co., Inc. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceed-
ing) (per curiam).
110. 931 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
111. Id. at 535. The supreme court specifically held that under the Texas Probate Code,
a probate court has no statutory authority to maintain control over estate funds in its regis-
try or to refuse to release such funds to an independent executor. Id. at 534 (quoting TEX.
PROB. CODE § 145(h) (Vernon Supp. 1995) (providing that, once an independent adminis-
tration has been created, "further action of any nature shall not be had in the county court
except where this Code specifically and explicitly provides for some action in the county
court.")).




Cases decided during the Survey period reflect that a party need not
demonstrate no adequate remedy by appeal to be entitled to mandamus
relief from a trial court's void order. The trial court in Sanchez v. Hes-
ter113 dismissed the plaintiff's lawsuit for want of prosecution against a
defendant that declared bankruptcy during the pendency of the law-
suit. 114 The plaintiff sought mandamus relief from the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals on the basis that the trial court's order dismissing his
case was void because it violated the automatic bankruptcy stay. 115 The
court of appeals agreed that the order was void and granted mandamus
relief, stating that "[a]ppeal is . . . 'wholly unnecessary' to establish the
invalidity of [the void] order. 11 6 Thus, the court concluded that the
plaintiff, "did not have a clear and adequate appellate remedy at law." 117
The San Antonio Court of Appeals similarly held in National Unity
Insurance Co. v. Johnson,"8 that a nunc pro tunc judgment that improp-
erly corrects a judicial, rather than a clerical, error is void and may be
corrected by mandamus." 9 In National Unity, the court of appeals held
that mandamus was necessary when the trial court, after it lost plenary
power, altered the original judgment dismissing both defendants to a
judgment dismissing only one defendant. 120 The court of appeals held
that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the nunc pro tunc judg-
ment and that the judgment was, therefore, void.' 21 Acknowledging that
under Walker v. Packer 22 an appeal is not an inadequate remedy simply
because it involves more expense or delay than obtaining an extraordi-
nary writ, the court nonetheless determined that mandamus relief was
appropriate because "more is at stake when the trial court has acted with-
out jurisdiction.' 23 The court reasoned that if mandamus relief is not
available, the defendant will be "forced to defend a lawsuit over which
the trial court has no jurisdiction.' 1 24 Further, if the defendant loses, it
will be unable to pursue an appeal because "the appellate court will also
be without jurisdiction.'1 25 Requiring a party to pursue legal action in
courts without jurisdiction, the court concluded, is not the type of "ade-
quate remedy at law contemplated by Walker."'1 26
113. 911 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, orig. proceeding).
114. Id. at 175.
115. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1994)).
116. Sanchez, 911 S.W.2d at 177 (quoting State v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex.
1995) (per curiam)).
117. Sanchez, 911 S.W.2d at 177.
118. 926 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
119. Id. at 822.
120. Id. at 820, 822.
121. Id. at 822.
122. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
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Likewise, in Gem Vending, Inc. v. Walker127 the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals held that a party is entitled to mandamus relief without having
to demonstrate that no adequate remedy by appeal exists if the trial court
enters a void order.128
e. Refusal to Rule on Motion for Summary Judgment
For the express purpose of preventing an interlocutory appeal, the trial
court in Grant v. Wood 129 refused to rule on the defendants' motion for
summary judgment.' 30 In that case, the defendants, members of the me-
dia, moved for summary judgment based in part on Chapter 73 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code' 3' and the federal and state constitu-
tions.' 32 Aware that section 51.014(6) of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code grants a statutory right to an interlocutory appeal from a trial court
order denying a motion for summary judgment based on Chapter 73 or
the federal or state constitutional free speech or free press clauses,133 the
trial court refused to rule on the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment. The trial court admitted that it did not want the trial of the case to
be postponed another "two years" due to the interlocutory appeal.' 34
The First Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief, holding that,
although a trial court has some discretion in the manner in which it rules
on motions for summary judgment, "[i]t is a clear abuse of discretion for
a trial court to refuse to rule on a timely submitted motion for summary
judgment when the trial court's express purpose in refusing to rule is to
preclude the movant from perfecting a statutory interlocutory appeal."'1 35
The court of appeals further held that relators had no adequate remedy
by appeal because (1) they would forfeit the benefit of the statutory inter-
locutory appeal if forced to proceed to trial, and (2) any post-trial appel-
late challenge to the trial court's failure to rule on the motion for
summary judgment would be pointless.136
127. 918 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, orig. proceeding).
128. Id. at 658 (holding that trial court order granting new trial was void where order
was entered after trial court's plenary jurisdiction expired).
129. 916 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding).
130. Id at 45.
131. Chapter 73 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code addresses liability for libel.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 73.001-.006 (Vernon 1986).
132. Grant, 916 S.W.2d at 43.
133. Section 51.014 provides, in pertinent part:
A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court, county
court at law, or county court that:
(6) denies a motion for summary judgment that is based in whole or in
part upon a claim against or defense by a member of the electronic or print
media, acting in such capacity, or a person whose communication appears in
or is published by the electronic or print media, arising under the free speech
or free press clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, or Article 1, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution, or Chapter 73.
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 51.014(6) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
134. Grant, 916 S.W.2d at 43-45.
135. Id at 45.
136. Id at 46.
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f. Order Requiring the Production of Privileged Documents
During the Survey period, the supreme court affirmed that it is "well
settled that an erroneous order requiring the production of privileged
documents leaves the party claiming privilege without an adequate rem-
edy by appeal."'1 37
3. Orders: Circumstances Not Warranting Mandamus Relief
a. Order Severing Claims
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed that
mandamus will not issue "'if for any reason it would be useless or unavail-
ing.' ' 138 In the underlying litigation in Dow Chemical, women who re-
ceived silicone breast implants filed a lawsuit against Dow Chemical
Corporation, Corning Incorporated and Dow Corning Corporation
(owned by Dow Chemical and Corning Inc.), alleging tortious conduct in
the manufacturing of the breast implants.' 39 Dow Corning filed bank-
ruptcy and removed all breast implant cases pending against it and Dow
Chemical to federal court.140 The federal district court, however, deter-
mined that it did not have jurisdiction over the claims against Dow
Chemical and remanded those claims to state court. 141 The state court
severed the claims against Dow Coming and the other defendants, and
continued to proceed with the plaintiffs' claims against Dow Chemical.' 42
Seeking mandamus relief, Dow Chemical complained to the supreme
court that the trial court abused its discretion in severing the claims
against it from the claims against Dow Corning because the plaintiffs'
claims against the two parties presented the same issues of fact and
law. 143 Without addressing the merits of the severance, the supreme
court dismissed the mandamus proceeding, holding that the claims
against Dow Coming could not be resolved anywhere other than in the
federal system and, therefore, could not be rejoined in state court with
the claims against Dow Chemical. 44 The supreme court concluded that
directing the trial court to vacate the severance order would "have no
practical effect" and refused to issue a mandamus that would be "'useless
137. Memorial Hosp.-The Woodlands v. McCown, 927 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Tex. 1996) (orig.
proceeding) (holding that mandamus is appropriate to correct trial court discovery order
where documents are protected from discovery under the medical peer review committee
privilege). See Irving Healthcare Sys. v. Brooks, 927 S.W.2d 12, 21 (Tex. 1996) (orig. pro-
ceeding) (mandamus appropriate where documents are protected by the medical peer re-
view committee privilege); Gulf Health Care, Inc. v. Lerner, 932 S.W.2d 488, 488-89 (Tex.
1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (directing trial court to reconsider discovery order in
light of supreme court's opinions in Memorial Hosp.-The Woodlands and Irving Healthcare
Sys.).
138. Dow Chem. Co. v. Garcia, 909 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding)
(quoting Holcombe v. Fowler, 9 S.W.2d 1028, 1028 (1928)).





144. Id. at 505.
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or unavailing.""'145
b. Order Refusing to Sever Claims
In Liberty National Fire Insurance Co. v. Akin, 146 an insured brought
breach of contract and bad faith claims against her homeowner's insur-
ance carrier after the carrier denied coverage for damage to her house
caused by a shifting foundation. 147 At trial, the carrier asked the trial
court to sever the insured's breach of contract claims from her bad faith
claim, arguing that certain evidence admissible on the bad faith claim
would be inadmissible on the contract claim. 148 The trial court denied the
carrier's motion for severance and the court of appeals denied mandamus
relief.149
Considering the carrier's request for mandamus relief, the Texas
Supreme Court reiterated that a writ of mandamus will not issue "absent
a clear abuse of discretion that leaves the aggrieved party no adequate
remedy at law.' 50 To satisfy the clear abuse of discretion standard, the
court held, the relator must show "'that the trial court could reasonably
have reached only one decision.""'151
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the supreme court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the
plaintiff's breach of contract claim from her bad faith claim.152 The court
found that her claims were so interwoven that "most of the evidence in-
troduced [would] be admissible on both claims, and any prejudicial effect
[could] be reasonably ameliorated by appropriate limiting instructions to
the jury."'1 53 Although the court held that, under some circumstances,
severance might be necessary in the bad faith context,' 54 such circum-
stances were not present in Liberty National. 55
c. Challenge to Constitutionality of Attorney Occupation Tax
Although the Texas Supreme Court has exclusive administrative au-
thority to regulate the practice of law in Texas, this does not mean that it
has exclusive original jurisdiction over any action affecting attorneys in
Texas.156 The relators in Chenault sought, by way of mandamus, a decla-
145. Id. (quoting Holcombe, 9 S.W.2d at 1028 (1928)).
146. 927 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
147. Id. at 628.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 629 (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992)).
151. Id. at 630 (quoting Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. The court stated that a "trial court will undoubtedly confront instances in
which evidence admissible only on the bad faith claim would prejudice the insurer to such
an extent that a fair trial on the contract claim would become unlikely." Id.
155. Id.




ration that the Attorney Occupation Tax in Texas is unconstitutional. 157
The relators, however, did not first challenge the tax in district court. 158
Noting the relators' right to challenge the tax in district court and then to
appeal any adverse ruling through the ordinary appellate process, the
supreme court held that under Walker v. Packer,159 the relators failed to
meet their burden of showing that pursuing their claims first in the trial
court would cause them to suffer immediate harm entitling them to man-
damus relief.160 The court further held that its inherent powers to regu-
late the bar are administrative powers, not jurisdictional powers. 161 Thus,
while the court has original jurisdiction to regulate the Texas bar, it has
no original jurisdiction over a claim merely challenging a statute that af-
fects lawyers. 162
d. Order Setting Abbreviated Schedule for Discovery in Venue
Determination Context
Although the supreme court has held that an inadequate remedy by
appeal may exist where the trial court denies discovery and thereby pre-
vents a party from presenting a viable claim or defense at trial, 63 manda-
mus will not issue to correct a trial court's order limiting discovery and
setting an abbreviated discovery schedule where the party seeking man-
damus fails to show "harm."'1 64 The plaintiffs in Montalvo were not enti-
tled to mandamus relief because their only objection to the trial court's
ruling limiting discovery and setting an abbreviated schedule for hearing
on the defendants' motion to transfer venue was that the ruling was, in
effect, a discovery sanction. 65 The plaintiffs made no effort to present
evidence that "the limitation on discovery or the abbreviated schedule
deprived them of any ability to develop evidence pertinent to the venue
issue. ' 166 Without such a showing of harm, the court held, "the record is
wholly insufficient to establish that the plaintiffs lacked an adequate rem-
edy by appeal."'1 67
In keeping with its decision in Montalvo, the supreme court, in Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc. v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals,168 reaffirmed its posi-
tion that "venue determinations generally are incidental trial rulings that
are correctable on appeal."'1 69 In Bridgestone/Firestone, the defendants
157. Id. at 141. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 191.141-.145 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
158. Id.
159. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
160. Chenault, 914 S.W.2d at 141.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Able Supply Co. v. Moye, 898 S.W.2d 766, 772 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding).
164. Montalvo v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 917 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam).
165. Id. at 2.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 929 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
169. Id. at 441.
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sought to transfer venue from Hidalgo County to Dallas County. 170 The
venue hearing was set five months after the lawsuit was filed, but the
plaintiffs had failed to conduct any discovery until the date that their re-
sponse to the venue motion was due.171 At the hearing, the plaintiffs
sought and obtained a continuance. 172 On the day of the second hearing,
the plaintiffs sought another continuance. 173 The trial court denied the
second continuance and transferred the cause to Dallas County. 174 The
court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to mandamus
relief because the trial court had deprived them of their "opportunity for
reasonable discovery on venue.' 75
Comparing the facts of the case to the "extraordinary circumstances"
of Union Carbide Corp. v. Moye,176 the supreme court disagreed. 77 Ac-
cording to the court, no "extraordinary circumstances" existed in Bridge-
stone/Firestone and the trial court could reasonably have concluded that
the plaintiffs had an opportunity to obtain, but did not diligently pursue,
discovery on venue. 178
e. Order Denying Continuance to Allow Jury Request to Become
Timely
In General Motors Corp. v. Gayle,179 defendant General Motors relied
upon a co-defendant's representation that a jury request had been made
and the fee had been paid. 180 General Motors learned too late that no
fee had been paid.' 8' When the case was called to trial, General Motors
filed a formal jury request, paid the fee, and sought a continuance to al-
low the request to become timely.182 The trial court denied the jury re-
quest, since it was filed less than thirty days before trial, and refused to
grant the continuance.183 Seeking mandamus relief, General Motors ar-
gued to the court of appeals that communications from the trial court had







176. 798 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. 1990).
177. Bridgestone/Firestone, 929 S.W.2d at 441-42. The supreme court noted that, unlike
in the case before it, the trial court in Union Carbide had misled the party seeking the
venue transfer about the form of proof that would be acceptable at the venue hearing,
effectively depriving that party of its fundamental due process right to notice and a hear-
ing. Id. (citing Union Carbide, 798 S.W.2d at 793).
178. Id. In contrast to and perhaps derogation of the supreme court's position on this
issue, the Waco Court of Appeals in Lanier v. Stem, 931 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996,
orig. proceeding), corrected by mandamus a trial court's improper venue determination
without commenting on the propriety of reviewing the determination by mandamus.
179. 924 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, orig. proceeding).
180. Id. at 225. The court noted that "[a] jury request and jury fee payment by one
party inures to the benefit of all other parties to the suit." Id. at 225 n.1.





fact, the trial court admitted at the continuance hearing that it thought
the case was set for trial to a jury. 184
Refusing to grant mandamus relief, the court of appeals held that an
error in denying a jury trial can be remedied on appeal. 185 Therefore,
even if the trial court abused its discretion in denying the continuance,
General Motors failed to demonstrate that its remedy by appeal would be
inadequate.186
4. Mandamus Practice
Although, under most circumstances, a petition for writ of mandamus
must be presented to the court of appeals before filing a petition in the
Texas Supreme Court, the supreme court in Mendoza v. Eighth Court of
Appeals187 clarified that, unlike the prerequisites to filing an application
for writ of error, "the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure do not require
or provide for a motion for rehearing of a petition for writ of mandamus
in the court of appeals" before pursuing mandamus in the supreme
court.' 88 A party, therefore, does not waive his right to seek mandamus
review in the supreme court by failing to file a motion for rehearing of a
petition for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals.' 89
Moreover, under certain "compelling" circumstances, a party need not
seek mandamus relief in the court of appeals before filing a petition in
the Texas Supreme Court.a90 For example, the supreme court permitted
a party to bypass the court of appeals in Davis v. Taylor.19 1 Through no
fault of his own, the relator in Davis-the Republican Party's nominee
for the office of Chief Justice of the Tenth Court of Appeals-failed to be
timely certified with the Secretary of State as the Party's nominee for the
1996 general elections. 192 Just days before the voting ballots were to be
issued, Davis learned that the Secretary of State was rejecting his certifi-
cation.' 93 In light of the impending ballot issuance, the supreme court
held that "compelling circumstances justify bypassing the court of appeals
in this instance."'1 94
184. Id.
185. Id. at 226-27.
186. Id. at 227.
187. 917 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
188. Id. at 789 (comparing TEX. R. App. P. 121(a)(1) with TEX. R. App. P. 100).
189. Id.
190. Rule 121(a)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
When the court of appeals is authorized to exercise concurrent jurisdiction
over an original proceeding, the motion should first be presented to the court
of appeals. The motion for leave to file in the Supreme Court shall state the
date of presentation of the petition to the court of appeals and that court's
action on the motion or petition or the compelling reason that a motion was
not first presented to the court of appeals.
TEX. R. App. P. 121(a)(1) (emphasis added).
191. 930 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
192. Id. at 582.
193. Id.
194. Id. Under circumstances comparable to those of Davis, the supreme court in Bird
v. Rothstein, 930 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding), similarly held that "the immi-
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The Texas Supreme Court has held that mandamus relief may not be
available to help those who do not diligently pursue their rights. 195
Nonetheless, the court of appeals in Sanchez v. Hester,196 held that a
seven month delay between the entry of the trial court's order dismissing
the relator's case for want of prosecution and the filing of the relator's
petition for writ of mandamus did not preclude the relator from seeking
mandamus relief where the real parties in interest are not harmed as a
result of the relator's delay in seeking his remedy.197
B. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
1. Class Certification Orders
A party may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court that
"certifies or refuses to certify a class in a suit brought under Rule 42 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure."'1 98 Although an order that merely
modifies a certification order (for example, changing the size of a class) is
not immediately appealable under this statute because it is not an order
that "certifies or refuses to certify a class,"1 99 the Texas Supreme Court
recently held that an order that "alters the fundamental nature of the
class" (for example, changing a class from opt-out to mandatory) is imme-
diately appealable under the statute.200
nence of the election places this case within the narrow class of cases in which resort to the
court of appeals is excused." Id. at 587.
195. Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (re-
fusing to grant mandamus relief when defendant sat on his right to quash a jury demand
for four months).
196. 911 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
197. Id. at 177.
198. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 1997); TEX. R. Civ.
P. 42. Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides, in relevant
part:
A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court, county
court at law, or county court that:
(3) certifies or refuses to certify a class in a suit brought under Rule 42 of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure ....
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 1996). Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 42 provides, in pertinent part:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all mem-
bers is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims .or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
199. See Pierce Mortuary Colleges, Inc. v. Bjerke, 841 S.W.2d 878, 880-81 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1992, writ denied).
200. De Los Santos v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 933 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. 1996) (per
curiam). According to the supreme court in De Los Santos, changing the class from opt-
out to mandatory altered the fundamental nature of the class because it did more than
simply enlarge the class membership. Id. To the extent any ambiguity exists regarding the
character of a given modification to a class certification order, the conservative appellate
practitioner should assume the order is immediately appealable and attempt an interlocu-
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2. Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal
As a general rule, an appeal from an interlocutory order does not sus-
pend enforcement of the interlocutory order or trial pending the ap-
peal.201 The rules of appellate procedure, however, give appellate courts
authority to issue temporary orders pending determination of an interloc-
utory appeal if the appellate court finds such orders "necessary to pre-
serve the rights of the parties until disposition of the appeal."202 In Teran
v. Valdez,203 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals considered a temporary
order staying proceedings in the trial court pending interlocutory appeal
of an order denying the appellant's motion for summary judgment based
on an assertion of immunity.2 04 The court held that the temporary order
was necessary to preserve the rights of the appellant, who would be sub-
stantially deprived of his right to immunity if forced to trial before appel-
late review of the interlocutory order.20 5
III. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
A. FUNDAMENTAL ERROR
The only type of complaint that may be raised on appeal without hav-
ing first been brought to the attention of the trial court is one involving
fundamental error.20 6 Fundamental error occurs only in extremely lim-
ited circumstances when the record shows on its face that the court
lacked jurisdiction or that a public interest is directly and adversely af-
fected.20 7 Texas courts of appeals have routinely held that trial court er-
tory appeal since, if the order is immediately appealable under section 51.014, the court of
appeals may refuse to review the order after a final judgment is entered in the case. Id.
201. TEX. R. App. P. 43(a). Rule 43(a) provides, in relevant part:
No order denying interlocutory relief shall be suspended or superseded by an
appeal therefrom. The pendency of an appeal from an order authorizing a
cause to proceed as a class action suspends such order and also suspends trial
on the merits in such cases. Otherwise, the pendency of an appeal from an
order granting interlocutory relief does not suspend the order appealed from
Id.
202. Rule 43(c) provides:
On perfection of an appeal from an interlocutory order, the appellate court
may issue such temporary orders as it finds necessary to preserve the rights
of the parties until disposition of the appeal and may require such security as
it deems appropriate, but it shall not suspend the trial court's order if the
appellant's rights would be adequately protected by supersedeas or other or-
ders pursuant to Rules 47 or 49.
TEX. R. App. P. 43(c).
203. 929 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).
204. Texas law provides a statutory right to an interlocutory appeal from a trial court
order denying a motion for summary judgment that is "based on an assertion of immunity
by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the
state." TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(5) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
205. Teran, 929 S.W.2d at 39.
206. Texas Indus. Traffic League v. Railroad Comm'n, 633 S.W.2d 821, 822-23 (Tex.
1982), overruled on other grounds, Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852
S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993).
207. Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam).
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rors involving the rights of minors are fundamental because "the interest
of the state in their welfare and protection weighs on the side of finding a
sufficient public interest. ' 208 The supreme court may disagree. In a per
curiam writ denial, the supreme court in In re J. G.20 9 expressly stated that
it neither approved nor disapproved of the court of appeals' holding that
constitutional claims made by a juvenile are claims of fundamental error
that may be raised for the first time on appeal. 210
B. ORAL RULING ON MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
Is a ruling denying an oral motion for directed verdict appearing in the
statement of facts sufficient to preserve error? The El Paso Court of Ap-
peals recently addressed this issue in Pride Petroleum Services, Inc. v.
Criswell21' and, citing Rules 52(a) 212 and 52(c)(10) 213 of the Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure, answered the question "yes."'214 The court held
that these rules "plainly mean" that an oral motion made in open court
that is recorded and included in the statement of facts is sufficient to pre-
serve error.215 The court expressly declined to follow the courts holding
otherwise.216
C. OBJECTING TO THE CHARGE
Although, in the wake of the supreme court's opinion in State Depart-
208. In re J.G., 905 S.W.2d 676, 680 n.1 (Tex. App.-Texarkana), writ denied per
curiam, 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1995). See In re G.A.O. v. State, 854 S.W.2d 710, 715 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ).
209. 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
210. Id. at 949.
211. 924 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, writ denied).
212. Id. at 721. Rule 52(a) provides, in relevant part:
In order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have
presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the
specific grounds for the ruling he desired the court to make .... It is also
necessary for the complaining party to obtain a ruling upon the party's re-
quest, objection or motion .... It is not necessary to formally except to rul-
ings or orders of the trial court.
TEX. R. App. P. 52(a).
213. Pride Petroleum, 924 S.W.2d at 721. Rule 52(c)(10) provides, in relevant part:
"Anything occurring in open court or in chambers that is reported and so certified by the
court reporter may be included in the statement of facts rather than in a formal bill of
exception ...." TEX. R. App. P. 52(c)(10).
214. Pride Petroleum, 924 S.W.2d at 721.
215. Id.
216. Id. In support of its argument that an order overruling a motion for directed ver-
dict must appear in the judgment or be recited in a separate formal written order to prop-
erly preserve error, the appellee in Pride Petroleum referred the court to Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Berry, 833 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied), Western Co. of N.
Am. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 819 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ), Soto
v. Southern Life & Health Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no
writ), Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Allen, 664 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Southwestern Materials Co. v. George Consol. Inc., 476 S.W.2d 454
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Pride Petroleum, 924 S.W.2d
at 721. Rejecting the appellee's argument and cited authority, the court stated that it could
"not see why an oral ruling on a motion for directed verdict that is fully recorded in the
statement of facts will not preserve error." Id.
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ment of Highways & Public Transportation v. Payne,217 courts of appeals
are less likely to find waiver of charge error resulting from noncompli-
ance with the technicalities of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 276, appel-
lants must still "bring the matter to the [trial] court's attention" and
"obtain a ruling.1218 Thus, the appellant's failure to secure the notation
"Refused" on her requested instruction in Munoz did not, by itself, con-
stitute waiver of her complaint on appeal regarding the trial court's omis-
sion of the instruction. 219 But, the appellant's failure, at the formal
charge conference, to specifically object to the omission of the instruction
when she tendered the proposed instruction to the court as part of her
entire proposed charge, did constitute waiver.220 The record did not indi-
cate that the appellant specifically brought the omitted instruction to the
court's attention. 221 The trial judge, the court of appeals concluded,
"may, or may not, have been aware that this requested instruction was
tucked away in the requested charge. 222
IV. FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court in Park Place Hos-
pital v. Estate of Milo 223 and Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer224 reaf-
firmed its previous holding in Mafrige v. Ross. 225 Specifically, "[a]ll
parties and all issues before the trial court must be disposed of before a
summary judgment becomes final and appealable. '226 As reflected in
Park Place and Kiefer, however, the "finality" requirement may be more
217. 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992).
218. Munoz v. Berne Group, Inc., 919 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996,
no writ).
219. Id.
220. Id. Rule 276 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:
When an instruction, question, or definition is requested and the provisions
of the law have been complied with and the trial judge refuses the same, the
judge shall endorse thereon "Refused," and sign the same officially .... Such
refused or modified instruction, question, or definition, when so endorsed
shall constitute a bill of exceptions, and it shall be conclusively presumed that
the party asking the same presented it at the proper time, excepted to its
refusal or modification, and that all the requirements of law have been ob-
served, and such procedure shall entitle the party requesting the same to
have the action of the trial judge thereon reviewed without preparing a for-
mal bill of exceptions.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 276. The trial judge's notation of "Refused" on the requested instruction
"results in a legal presumption that the issue has been preserved for review." Munoz, 919
S.W.2d at 472. The rule, the court held, "does not make this the exclusive method by
which the refusal to give a jury instruction can be preserved for appellate review." Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. 909 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. 1995).
224. 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1996).
225. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
226. Park Place Hosp., 909 S.W.2d at 510; Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 276-77; Mafrige, 866
S.W.2d at 591.
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stringent when the summary judgment fails to expressly dispose of all
parties as opposed to all issues.
1. The Judgment Must Dispose of All Issues
In Kiefer, the plaintiff asserted a state law negligence claim against
Continental Airlines for injuries she sustained when she was struck in the
back of the head by a briefcase that fell from an overhead storage bin
while she was riding on a Continental Airlines plane.227 Continental Air-
lines moved for summary judgment "on all claims brought by" the plain-
tiff on the basis that the plaintiff's action was preempted by the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA).228 After Continental Airlines moved
for summary judgment, but prior to the trial court's ruling on the motion,
the plaintiff amended her petition to assert two new causes of action: an
implied cause of action under the ADA and a federal common-law negli-
gence action. 229
The trial court granted Continental Airlines' motion for summary judg-
ment expressly on the basis that the plaintiff's action was preempted by
the ADA.230 Although the trial court's summary judgment order stated
that "the cause of action"-as opposed to causes of action-"is dismissed
as being preempted," the judgment was entitled, "FINAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT."'231 Additionally, the plaintiff specifically drew to the trial
court's attention her federal causes of action in her response to the mo-
tion for summary judgment and in a motion for new trial.232 Neither the
parties nor the court of appeals suggested that the judgment was not
final.233
Analyzing the finality and appealability of the trial court's summary
judgment, the supreme court stated that "[f]inality must be resolved by a
determination of the intention of the court as gathered from the language
of the decree and the record as a whole, aided on occasion by the conduct
of the parties. '234 Focusing on the trial court's characterization of the
judgment as a "FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT" and the fact that the
federal causes of action were drawn to the trial court's attention, the
supreme court concluded that, under the circumstances, "the district
court intended to render a final, appealable judgment." 235
227. 920 S.W.2d at 275.
228. Id. at 275-76.
229. Id. at 276.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 277.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. (citation omitted).
235. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 277. The court of appeals' opinion in Kiefer stated that the
court was reversing the trial court's summary judgment only on the plaintiff's state com-
mon-law negligence claim. Id. The court of appeals' judgment, however, ordered "'that
the judgment of the court below be in all things reversed and the cause remanded for
proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court."' Id. at 277 (emphasis added). The
judgment of the court of appeals, therefore, conflicted with its opinion. Noting that the
mandate of the court of appeals "must issue in accordance with the judgment" under Rule
1997]
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2. The Judgment Must Dispose of All Parties
In Park Place, the supreme court held that, under circumstances in
which a plaintiff nonsuits one of several defendants but obtains no order
dismissing the nonsuited defendant, a summary judgment rendered in
favor of the remaining defendants that contains no Mother Hubbard
clause 236 is not final until the trial court signs an order either dismissing
the nonsuited defendant or severing the plaintiff's claims against the non-
suited defendant from its claims against the remaining defendants that
succeeded on summary judgment.2 37 In Park Place, a medical malprac-
tice action, the plaintiffs filed suit against five defendants, including Dr.
Badlissi and Dr. Walkes.2 38 The plaintiffs never obtained service on Dr.
Badlissi and nonsuited Dr. Walkes, although no court order was entered
dismissing him. 239 After Dr. Walkes was nonsuited (but not dismissed),
the remaining defendants moved and obtained summary judgment.2 40
Ten days after granting summary judgment, the trial court severed all of
the plaintiffs' claims against Dr. Badlissi and Dr. Walkes from the claims
against the remaining defendants who had obtained summary judg-
ment.241 The plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial and perfected their
appeal ninety days after the trial court rendered its order of severance.2 42
On appeal, the defendants argued that the appellate timetable ran from
the issuance of the summary judgment rather than from the signing of the
severance order, rendering the plaintiff's appeal late.2 43 The supreme
court disagreed, holding that the summary judgment was not a final, ap-
pealable order because it did not dispose of the claims against Dr. Walkes
and Dr. Badlissi, and it contained no Mother Hubbard clause.2 44 The
supreme court specifically held that, although the plaintiffs had filed no-
tice to nonsuit Dr. Walkes, "the appellate timetable could not be trig-
gered until a signed, written order of the court dismissed him. '2 45
In Atchison v. Weingarten Realty Management Co.,246 a case decided
after Park Place, the First Court of Appeals similarly held that a summary
judgment that does not explicitly dispose of all claims and parties and
contains no Mother Hubbard clause is not final until nonsuited defend-
ants that are not named in the summary judgment are dismissed by an
86(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the supreme court held that "the lan-
guage of the judgment controls over the conflicting language of the opinion." Id. As a
result, the court of appeals' reversal of the summary judgment was as to all of the plaintiff's
claims. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 277.
236. Generally, "Mother Hubbard" clauses recite that "all relief not expressly granted
is denied." Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 590 n.1.









246. 916 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
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order granting the nonsuit.247
Appellate practitioners should be aware, however, that despite the ap-
parent clarity of the supreme court's holding in Park Place-that a sum-
mary judgment is not a final appealable judgment if it (a) is against fewer
than all defendants, (b) contains no Mother Hubbard clause, and (c) is
rendered while a motion for nonsuit is pending-the First Court of Ap-
peals characterized the supreme court's holding as a mere "sugges-
tion. ' 248 In fact, the First Court of Appeals in Atchison submitted that
the summary judgment in Park Place was a final appealable judgment,
but that the severance order, which was signed within the trial court's
thirty-day plenary power over the summary judgment, operated to delay
the commencement of the appellate timetable until the date it was
signed.249 This analysis appears to be at odds with the supreme court's
clear holding in Park Place that a summary judgment is not final until the
trial court signs an order either dismissing nonsuited defendants or sever-
ing a plaintiff's claims against nonsuited defendants from its claims
against remaining defendants disposed of by summary judgment. 250
3. The Effect of a Mother Hubbard Clause
What is the effect of a Mother Hubbard clause in a summary judgment
that does not expressly dispose of all parties and issues? In Gilchrist v.
Bandera Electric Cooperative, Inc.,251 decided one month prior to the
supreme court's decision in Kiefer, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
held that a summary judgment that did not expressly dispose of the de-
fendant's counterclaims against the plaintiff was interlocutory despite the
fact that the judgment contained a Mother Hubbard clause.252 In Gil-
247. Id. at 76. In Atchison, the summary judgment expressly disposed of the plaintiff's
primary cause of action against the defendant, but did not address the defendant's cross-
claims for contribution and indemnity against third-party defendants. Atchison, 916
S.W.2d at 75-76. The summary judgment did not contain a Mother Hubbard clause. Id. at
75 n.2. Nonetheless, the Atchison court of appeals examined the possibility that, even ab-
sent a Mother Hubbard clause, the summary judgment also disposed of the defendant's
cross-claims for contribution and indemnity, since those claims were not independent
causes of action but existed only as derivative claims of the plaintiffs primary cause of
action, which was disposed of by summary judgment. Id. at 76. However, the court con-
cluded that, while the summary judgment implicitly disposed of the defendant's cross-
claims by disposing of the plaintiffs primary cause of action (which necessarily rendered
the cross-claims no longer viable), a summary judgment that implicitly disposes of all issues
and parties is still not final. Id. Under Mafrige, "a summary judgment which does not
contain a 'Mother Hubbard' clause must explicitly dispose of all issues and parties before
the judgment becomes final." Atchison, 916 S.W.2d at 76 (emphasis in original) (citing
Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 591-92).
248. Atchison, 916 S.W.2d at 76 n.3.
249. Atchison, 916 S.W.2d at 75 n.3.
250. 909 S.W.2d at 510.
251. 924 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996), rev'd per curiam, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 441 (Mar. 21, 1997) (not released for publication).
252. Id. at 390 (citation omitted). In an opinion issued after the Survey period, the
supreme court reversed the court of appeals' finding that the judgment was not final and
held that a summary judgment is final for appeal purposes even if it grants more relief than
requested if it contains a Mother Hubbard clause. On appeal, the proper disposition by
19971
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christ, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on its "entire claim"
against the defendant, but made no mention of the defendant's counter-
claims against the plaintiff.253 The trial court's summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiff included a Mother Hubbard clause, purporting to
dispose of all parties and issues.254 The summary judgment, therefore,
granted the plaintiff more relief than requested. 255
Citing Mafrige256 and Teer v. Duddlesten,257 the court of appeals held
that
where a summary judgment order is appealed which appears to be
final on its face, but which should have been partial and interlocu-
tory, in the absence of an order of severance, the appellate courts
should reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court for dispo-
sal of all remaining parties and issues in a final appealable order.258
Since the motion for summary judgment in Gilchrist failed to address
the defendant's counterclaims and the counterclaims were not severed,
the proper remedy, the court of appeals held, was to reverse and remand,
without consideration of the merits of the summary judgment, for disposi-
tion or severance of the counterclaims that were not addressed in the
motion for summary judgment. 259 The court expressly rejected the no-
tion that the inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause in a summary judg-
ment "amounts to an all-encompassing procedural safeguard, operating
to make any summary judgment final and appealable as to all parties and
causes of action, notwithstanding the fact that such relief was not
requested. "260
An apparent distinction between the facts of Gilchrist and those of
Kiefer-in which the supreme court found a summary judgment to be
final although the summary judgment contained no Mother Hubbard
clause and the nonmoving party asserted additional claims after the mo-
tion for summary judgment was filed-is the fact that the moving party in
Kiefer moved for summary judgment "on all claims brought by" the non-
the court of appeals is to consider the summary judgment on the merits and remand any
portion that grants more relief than requested. See 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 441.
253. Id. at 389.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
257. 664 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. 1984).
258. Gilchrist, 924 S.W.2d at 390.
259. Id. at 390-91. In the event the counterclaims are not severable, the court held, the
summary judgment "remains interlocutory until the counterclaims are adjudicated." Id. at
391.
260. Id. at 393. The dissent in Gilchrist argued that the court of appeals should have
affirmed that part of the judgment dealing with the plaintiffs claims and reversed and
remanded that part of the judgment improperly disposing of the defendant's counter-
claims. Id. at 394 (Duncan, J., dissenting). In the dissent's opinion, the court of appeals
had jurisdiction over the appeal because the Mother Hubbard clause rendered the trial
court's judgment final and appealable, although the judgment "simply contain[ed] revers-
ible error as to [the defendant's] counterclaims." Id. at 398. The majority characterized
the dissent as proposing that the court of appeals sua sponte sever the counterclaims in
order to consider the merits of "what is, in fact, an interlocutory partial summary judg-
ment." Id. at 399.
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moving party, "thus including the two [additional] claims even though
they were first raised after the motion was filed. ' 261 In Gilchrist, the
plaintiff expressly moved for summary judgment only on its claims
against the defendant and did not even mention or purport to move for
summary judgment on the defendant's counterclaims. 262 The summary
judgment in that case, however, contained a Mother Hubbard clause that
disposed of all claims, which should have resulted in a final, appealable
judgment.263
4. Finality of a Summary Judgment on Improperly Severed Claims
According to the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals, if a trial court errs
in severing certain claims in a case and rendering summary judgment on
those claims, the severed summary judgment, although erroneous, is final
for purposes of appeal.2 64 The proper remedy on appeal is to reverse the
judgment and remand the case for trial.265 As the Nicor court acknowl-
edged, however, this holding is directly contrary to the El Paso Court of
Appeals' decision in Cass v. Stephens,266 in which the El Paso court held
that if a severance is improper, summary judgment on the severed claims
is not final, resulting in the court of appeals having no jurisdiction over
the case.267 In disagreeing with Cass, the Nicor court argued that the
supreme court in Mafrige268 directed courts of appeals to treat a judg-
ment that on its face purports to be final as such for purposes of ap-
peal.269 The judgment in the severed portion of the action, the Corpus
Christi court held, "is final for the purpose of determining appellate juris-
diction without respect to whether the severance was proper. '270
B. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
In contrast to a judgment entered following a trial on the merits, "a
default judgment carries no presumption of finality. ''271 As in the sum-
mary judgment context, to determine the issue of finality of a default
judgment, the court must "divine the intention of the trial court 'from the
261. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 276.
262. 924 S.W.2d at 389.
263. Inglish v. Union State Bank, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 234 (Jan. 10, 1997) (although the
opinion has not yet been released for publication in the permanent law, the court held that
a summary judgment containing a Mother Hubbard clause is final and appealable, even if
it grants more relief than requested).
264. Nicor Exploration Co. v. Florida Gas Transmission Co., 911 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied). The court in Nicor held that the severance in
that case was improper because the severed claim was so interwoven with the remaining
action that it involved the same facts and issues. Id.
265. Id.
266. 823 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
267. Nicor, 911 S.W.2d at 482 (citing Cass, 823 S.W.2d at 733).
268. Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 592 (Tex. 1993).
269. Nicor, 911 S.W.2d at 482.
270. Id.




language of the decree and the record as a whole, aided on occasion by
the conduct of the parties.' '272 Applying these rules, the court of appeals
in Zamarripa concluded that a default judgment that contains no Mother
Hubbard clause and that does not expressly dispose of, or is otherwise
completely silent on, the claim of prejudgment interest pled in the plain-
tiffs petition, is not a final, appealable default judgment. 273
In Zamarripa, the defendants filed an answer on the same day but after
a default judgment was taken.274 Plaintiff's counsel did not inform de-
fendants' counsel of the default judgment, and the parties engaged in dis-
covery and settlement talks after the judgment was entered. 275 Some
eight months later, defendants learned of the default judgment. 276 De-
fendants challenged the default judgment by motion to reconsider, but
the trial court held that its plenary power had expired and that it had no
jurisdiction to consider the motion.277
On appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals analyzed the finality of
the eight month old default judgment. 278 If the default judgment was fi-
nal, the appeal was untimely and would have to be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction; if interlocutory, the appeal would have to be dismissed for
failure to bring a final appealable judgment.279 Asserting that the judg-
ment was final, the plaintiff argued that the omission of prejudgment in-
terest from the default judgment did not render the judgment
interlocutory, because the awarding of prejudgment interest is mandatory
in personal injury cases under article 5069-1.05, section 6(a) of the Texas
Revised Civil Statutes.280 Rejecting the plaintiff's argument, the court of
appeals found that, under the circumstances of the case, the calculation of
prejudgment interest would not be purely ministerial. 281 The pending
dates and amounts of settlement offers among the parties, which were not
clear in the record, would have to be considered in calculating prejudg-
ment interest. 282 Since the calculation of prejudgment interest would in-
volve factual issues unresolved by the default judgment, the judgment
was interlocutory. 283 Moreover, the court concluded, the plaintiff's
postjudgment engagement in discovery on the substantive liability issues
in the case reflected that even the plaintiff did not believe the default
judgment was final.284
272. Id. (citing Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 277).
273. Id. at 658.






280. Id. at 657.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 657-58.
284. Id.
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C. TURNOVER ORDERS
A turnover order is a final, appealable judgment, and a court of ap-
peals errs in dismissing an appeal from a turnover order for lack of juris-
diction when the appellant perfects his appeal within thirty days of the
order.285 In Burns, the Dallas Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal
from a turnover order, holding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over
the case because a turnover order is an interlocutory order and the appel-
lant had filed his cost bond more than twenty days after the signing of the
judgment.286 The supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals, holding that a turnover order is not an interlocutory order and
that the appellant had complied with the thirty day deadline for perfec-
tion permitted by Rule 41 of the rules of appellate procedure. 28 7
V. EXTENDING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
A. TRIAL COURT JURISDICTION OVER POST-VERDICT MOTIONS
1. Motions to Modify the Judgment
In L.M. Healthcare, Inc. v. Childs,288 the supreme court held that a
motion to modify judgment filed after denial of a motion for new trial,
but within thirty days of judgment, was timely, extending the trial court's
plenary jurisdiction to sign a modified judgment within seventy-five days
of judgment. 289 The supreme court rejected the concern of the court of
appeals in that case that, by filing subsequent postjudgment motions, a
party could delay the running of the court's plenary power indefinitely.290
The court pointed out that the extension of the trial court's plenary
power applies only to motions filed within thirty days from the date the
trial court signed the judgment. As a result, the "trial court's plenary
jurisdiction cannot extend beyond 105 days after the trial court signs the
285. Burns v. Miller, Hiersche, Martens & Hayward, P.C., 909 S.W.2d 505, 506 (Tex.
1995) (per curiam).
286. Id.; TEX. R. App. P. 42. Rule 42 requires appeals from interlocutory orders (when
allowed by law) to be perfected within twenty days after the judgment is signed. TEX. R.
App. P. 42(a)(3). Rule 42(a)(3) specifically provides, in pertinent part:
In all accelerated appeals from interlocutory orders and in quo warranto pro-
ceedings, the bond, or the notice or affidavit in lieu thereof, shall be filed, or
the deposit in lieu of bond shall be made, within twenty days after the judg-
ment or order is signed.
Id.
287. Burns, 909 S.W.2d at 506. Rule 41(a)(1) provides, in relevant part:
When security for costs on appeal is required, the bond or affidavit in lieu
thereof shall be filed with the clerk within thirty days after the judgment is
signed, or, within ninety days after the judgment is signed if a timely motion
for new trial has been filed by any party or if any party has timely filed a
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in a case tried without a
jury. If a deposit of cash is made in lieu of bond, the same shall be made
within the same period.
TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(1).
288. 929 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).





2. Late-Filed Post-Verdict Motion
a. Rule 306a(4): Defendant Must Learn of Judgment Within Ninety
Days 29
2
A trial court does not have jurisdiction to consider a motion for new
trial filed 111 days after the entry of judgment where the defendant did
not receive notice of the judgment until 103 days after the judgment was
entered. 293 The plain language of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
306a(4)294 as construed by the supreme court in Levit v. Adams,29 5 limits
the extension of the trial court's plenary power to instances where the
defendant learns of the judgment within ninety days.296 As a result, a
trial court has no jurisdiction to grant a motion for new trial where the
defendant learns of a judgment more than ninety days after it is signed.297
b. Rule 306a(4): Defendant Must Establish Prima Facie Case of
Jurisdiction 298
A defendant who does not receive notice of judgment within twenty
days after it was signed must do more than just file a motion challenging
the judgment within thirty days of learning of the judgment. In his mo-
tion challenging the judgment, the defendant must establish a prima facie
case of jurisdiction to extend the trial court's plenary power over the mat-
ter.299 A late-filed post-verdict motion that is unsworn and/or does not
291. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c) (seventy-five days) and TEX. R. Ov. P. 329b(e)(30 days)).
292. TEX. R. Ov. P. 306(a)(4).
293. Graham v. Fashing, 928 S.W.2d 567, 568 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1996, orig.
proceeding).
294. Rule 306a(4) provides:
If within twenty days after the judgment or other appealable order is signed,
a party adversely affected by its or his attorney has neither received the no-
tice required by paragraph (3) of this rule nor acquired actual knowledge of
the order, then with respect to that party all the periods mentioned in para-
graph (1) shall begin on the date that such party or his attorney received such
notice or acquired actual knowledge of the signing, whichever occurred first,
but in no event shall such periods begin more than ninety days after the origi-
nal judgment or other appealable order was signed.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
295. 850 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
296. Graham, 928 S.W.2d at 569. See Levit, 850 S.W.2d at 470.
297. Graham, 928 S.W.2d at 569. Further, under Rule 306a(4), notice of judgment re-
ceived by the defendant's attorney constitutes notice to the defendant, commencing the
time for filing a motion for new trial. Gem Vending, Inc. v. Walker, 918 S.W.2d 656, 657-58(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, orig. proceeding) (appellate time periods not tolled
although defendant did not receive notice of judgment with 20 days of signing of judgment
where defendant's attorney of record received notice of judgment within 20 days of the
date judgment was signed).
298. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306(a)(4).
299. Gonzalez v. Sanchez, 927 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1996, no writ) (de-
fendant failed to establish prima facie case of jurisdiction in motion to set aside defaultjudgment); In re Simpson, 932 S.W.2d 674, 677-78 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ)(defendant failed to establish prima facie case of jurisdiction in motion for new trial).
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establish the first date that either the defendant or his attorney received
notice of the judgment fails to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction
and does not extend the trial court's plenary power.300
3. Motions for New Trial
a. Must Be Filed By a Party of Record
A motion for new trial extends the trial court's plenary power only
when the motion is filed by a party of record.301 A motion for new trial
filed by a party seeking intervention, therefore, does not extend the
court's plenary power.30 2
b. Can Be Considered Without Filing Fee
A trial court may, at its discretion, consider a motion for new trial
before the filing fee is paid.303
c. Justice Court
The filing of a motion for new trial in justice court is governed by Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 567, rather than Rule 329b(e). 304 Thus, a party
who files a motion for new trial in justice court has a maximum of twenty
days to file an appeal bond, rather than thirty days. 30 5
4. Motions to Reinstate
Disagreeing with the Fort Worth Court of Appeals' decision in Brim
Laundry Machinery Co. v. Washex Machinery Corp.,3°6 the Austin Court
of Appeals in Perez v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n 307 held that a
prematurely filed verified motion to reinstate operates to extend the ap-
pellate timetable.30 8
300. Gonzalez, 927 S.W.2d at 222; Simpson, 932 S.W.2d at 677- 78.
301. State & County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 915 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1996, orig. proceeding).
302. Id.
303. Kvanvig v. Garcia, 928 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, orig.
proceeding).
304. Searcy v. Sagullo, 915 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no
writ).
305. Id. at 597.
306. 854 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
307. 926 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ) (per curiam).
308. Id. at 426-27. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals relied on precedent
applying Rule 58(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to motions for new trial.
Id. Rule 58(a) states:
Proceedings relating to an appeal need not be considered ineffective because
of prematurity if a subsequent appealable order has been signed to which the
premature proceeding may properly be applied.
TEX. R. App. P. 58(a). Analogizing motions to reinstate to motions for new trial, the court
determined that a motion to reinstate should be considered "a proceeding relating to an
appeal" for purposes of Rule 58. Perez, 926 S.W.2d at 426-27.
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B. REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In Linwood v. NCNB Texas,309 the supreme court held that a request
for findings of fact and conclusions of law does not extend the appellate
timetable in a summary judgment proceeding because a summary judg-
ment proceeding is not an evidentiary hearing and, therefore, not "tried"
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296.310 Relying on the supreme
court's reasoning in Linwood, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in
O'Donnell v. McDaniel3 11 held that a request for findings of fact and con-
clusions of law did not extend the appellate timetable in an appeal from a
judgment dismissing a case on the pleadings with prejudice for failure "to
state an actionable cause. '312 Similarly, the Austin Court of Appeals in
Lusk v. Service Lloyds Insurance Co.313 held that a request for findings of
fact and conclusions of law is ineffective to extend the appellate timetable
in an appeal from a case dismissed for want of jurisdiction on the plead-
ings where there was no evidentiary hearing. 314
However, under the Austin courts decision in Hernandez v. Texas De-
partment of Insurance,315 if a trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing
on a plea to the jurisdiction and the cause is dismissed based upon evi-
dence presented and facts determined at the hearing, the supreme court's
holding in Linwood is not applicable and a request for findings of fact
and conclusions of law operates to extend the appellate timetable. 31 6
C. FILING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BY MAIL
In Stokes v. Aberdeen Insurance Co.,317 the Texas Supreme Court held
that mailing a motion to a district judge at his or her proper court address
instead of directly to the court clerk is "conditionally effective as mailing
it to the proper court clerk's address" so as to satisfy Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 5, provided that the clerk actually receives a copy of the docu-
ment within ten days to perfect the filing.318 Thus, a motion for new trial
that was mailed to the trial judge at the proper court address, but for-
warded to the clerk by Federal Express, was deemed timely filed. 319
309. 885 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1994).
310. Id. at 103.
311. 914 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
312. Id. at 210.
313. 922 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied) (per curiam).
314. Id. at 649.
315. 923 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
316. Id. at 194. Accord WISD Taxpayers Ass'n v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 912 S.W.2d
392, 394 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ) (per curiam) (holding that request for findings
of fact and conclusions of law did not operate to extend appellate timetable where case was
dismissed for want of jurisdiction without evidentiary hearing).
317. 917 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
318. Id. at 268.
319. Id.
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D. COMMENCEMENT OF THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
The Houston Court of Appeals affirmed that the appellate timetable
begins to run from a signed, written order, even when the signing of that
order is only ministerial.3 20 As a result, the appellate timetable runs from
when the trial court signs an order granting nonsuit, rather than when the
plaintiff files the notice of nonsuit.321
VI. SUPERSEDING THE JUDGMENT
A. ALTERNATE SECURITY IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES
In Isern v. Ninth Court of Appeals,322 the trial court issued an order
permitting Isern, a judgment debtor, to supersede execution of a $3.1 mil-
lion personal injury judgment by posting "alternate security" in an
amount less than the full amount of the judgment.323 The court of ap-
peals set aside the trial court's order, holding that, under sections
52.002324 and 52.005 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a
full supersedeas bond equal to the amount of the judgment, plus interest,
plus costs, must be posted in appeals from judgments rendered in per-
sonal injury actions.325 The supreme court disagrees.
Acknowledging section 52.002's inapplicability to personal injury cases,
the supreme court held that Rule 47(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appel-
late Procedure326 supplements section 52.002, affording the trial court
"the discretion to reduce the amount of security in personal injury actions
320. Glass v. Sponsel, 916 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ)
(per curiam).
321. Id
322. 925 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
323. Id. at 605.
324. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.002 (Vernon 1986). Section 52.002 pro-
vides, in relevant part:
A trial court rendering a judgment that awards recovery of a sum of money,
other than a judgment rendered in a ... personal injury or wrongful death
action, . . . may set the security in an amount less than the amount of the
judgment, interest, and costs if the trial court, after notice to all parties and a
hearing, finds that:
(1) setting the security at an amount equal to the amount of the judgment,
interest, and costs would cause irreparable harm to the judgment debtor; and
(2) setting the security at the lesser amount would not substantially decrease
the degree to which a judgment creditor's recovery under the judgment
would be secured after the exhaustion of all appellate remedies.
Id
325. 925 S.W.2d at 650.
326. Rule 47 provides, in relevant part:
(b) Money Judgment. When the judgment awards recovery of a sum of
money, the amount of the bond or deposit shall be at least the amount of the
judgment, interest, and costs. The trial court may make an order to provide
for security in an amount or type deviating from this general rule if after
notice to all parties and a hearing the trial court finds:
(1) as to civil judgments rendered in ... a personal injury or wrongful death
action, .. . that posting the amount of the bond or deposit will cause irrepara-
ble harm to the judgment debtor, and not posting such bond or deposit will
cause no substantial harm to the judgment creditor.
TEX. R. App. P. 47(b)(1).
1997]
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if the trial court finds that (1) posting the amount of the bond will cause
irreparable harm to the judgment debtor, and (2) not posting the full
bond will cause no substantial harm to the judgment creditor. '327 The
supreme court concluded that since, on its face, section 52.002 does not
prohibit alternate security in appeals from personal injury judgments, it
"does not apply to appeals from personal injury judgments. '32 8 Section
52.002, therefore, "simply addresses alternate security for appeals in cases
other than those involving personal injury. '329 As a result, a trial court
has discretion under Rule 47(b)(1) to set the supersedeas bond at a lesser
amount than the full amount of the judgment in appeals from judgments
rendered in personal injury actions. 330
B. THE BOND MUST PROVIDE SECURITY IN ADDITION TO THE
JUDGMENT DEBTOR'S ASSETS
The surety on the supersedeas bond "must provide security in addition
to the assets owned by the judgment debtor at the date judgment was
rendered against it.''331 A judgment debtor may not, therefore, simply
transfer assets equal in value to the bond to a third party and arrange for
that third party to act as surety on the judgment debtor's supersedeas
bond.332 Stretching the patience of the San Antonio Court of Appeals
thin by their supersedeas bond "antics," the judgment debtors in Trans-
American incorporated a new company post-judgment and transferred
assets owned by them in excess of the amount of the judgment to the new
company and then made the new company the surety on their superse-
deas bond.333 Declining the appellants' "invitation to make a mockery of
this court," 334 the San Antonio Court of Appeals reviewed the sufficiency
of the bond.335 The court held that, implicit in the requirement that the
327. Isern, 925 S.W.2d at 606.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court expressly overruled Laird v.
King, 866 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, orig. proceeding).
331. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Finkelstein, 911 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 154-56. The judgment debtors did this after the court of appeals had already
rejected their first supersedeas bond, which was insufficient because the sureties on the
bond consisted of the judgment debtors' subsidiaries. Id. at 154.
334. Id. at 155.
335. The court held that the sufficiency of a supersedeas bond may be determined in
the first instance by the court of appeals, in the absence of material factual disputes. Id. at
155. The court noted that nothing in Rules 47(k) and 49(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure "requires prior trial court review of a motion challenging the sufficiency of a
supersedeas bond." Id. TEX. R. App. P. 47(k), 49(a). Rule 47(k) provides, in relevant
part:
The trial court shall have continuing jurisdiction during the pendency of an
appeal from a judgment, even after the expiration of its plenary power, to
order the amount and the type of security and the sufficiency of sureties and,
upon any changed circumstances, to modify the amount or the type of secur-
ity required to continue the suspension of the execution of the judgment.
TEX. R. App. P. 47(k). Rule 49(a) provides:
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surety on a supersedeas bond provide security "in addition to the personal
liability of the appellant, for the payment of the judgment[,] ... is that the
surety must provide security in addition to the assets owned by the judg-
ment debtor at the date judgment was rendered against it.''336 If a judg-
ment debtor is permitted to simply transfer assets owned by the debtor to
a third party and arrange for the third party to act as surety on the judg-
ment debtor's supersedeas bond, "the judgment creditor would acquire
no security in addition to that provided by the judgment debtor at the
date of the judgment. '337 This, the court held, does not comport with
Texas law.
33 8
Rule 60(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure authorizes
courts of appeals to dismiss appeals as a penalty or sanction for an appel-
lant's failure to comply with any order of the court.339 Under the author-
ity of this rule, the Texarkana Court of Appeals dismissed the appellants'
appeal in Hayes v. Hayes340 for failure to post a supersedeas bond or
comply with post-judgment discovery orders.341
VII. PLENARY POWER OF THE TRIAL COURT
A. JUDGMENTS NUNC PRO TUNC
After the trial court loses plenary jurisdiction over a case, it can correct
only clerical errors-it cannot correct judicial errors.342 That is, after the
The sufficiency of a cost or supersedeas bond or deposit or the sureties
thereon or of any other bond or deposit under Rule 47 shall be reviewable by
the appellate court for insufficiency of the amount or of the sureties or of the
securities deposited, whether arising from initial insufficiency or from any
subsequent condition which may arise affecting the sufficiency of the bond or
deposit. The court in which the appeal is pending shall, upon motion show-
ing such insufficiency, require an additional bond or deposit to be filed with
and approved by the clerk of the trial court, and a certified copy to be filed in
the appellate court.
TEX. R. App. P. 49(a).
336. TransAmerican, 911 S.W.2d at 155 (emphasis in original).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. TEX. R. App. P. 60(a). Rule 60(a) provides, in relevant part:
(1) If an appeal or writ of error is subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction
or for failure of appellant to comply with any requirements of these rules or
any order of the court, the appellee may file a motion for dismissal or for
affirmance and judgment for costs on the appeal bond or for the cash
deposit....
(2) If it appears to the appellate court that an appeal or writ of error is sub-
ject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction or for failure to comply with any
requirements of these rules or any order of the court, the court may, on its
own motion, give notice to all parties that the case will be dismissed unless
the appellant or any party desiring to continue the appeal or writ of error,
files with the court within ten days a response showing grounds for continu-
ing the appeal or writ of error.
Id.
340. 920 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied) (per curiam).
341. Id. at 345.
342. TEX. R. Civ. P. 316, 329b(f); National Unity Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 926 S.W.2d 818,
820 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
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trial court loses plenary power, it can only correct the entry of a final
written judgment that incorrectly states the judgment actually ren-
dered.343 As a result, "even if the court renders incorrectly, it cannot
alter a written judgment which precisely reflects the incorrect rendi-
tion."'3 "4 Although the judicial or clerical nature of an error is a question
of law, factual questions concerning whether the court previously pro-
nounced judgment and the terms of the pronouncement must be an-
swered before this legal determination can be made. 345 Where there is no
evidence, however, that the trial court rendered a judgment other than
that contained in the written judgment, any error in the rendition is judi-
cial as a matter of law and cannot be corrected by a judgment nunc pro
tunc.
346
In keeping with the San Antonio Court of Appeals' decision in Na-
tional Unity, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's judg-
ment nunc pro tunc in Newsom v. Petrilli,347 where "satisfactory
evidence" existed to prove that the use of a word in the original judgment
was a clerical and not judicial error.348
B. SANCrIONS UNDER TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 13
In Scott & White Memorial Hospital v. Schexnider,349 the Texas
Supreme Court considered whether a trial court has the power during its
plenary jurisdiction to grant a motion for sanctions under Rule 13 of the
343. National Unity, 926 S.W.2d at 820.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 820-21. After the parties settled in National Unity, Judge Gebhardt, the trial
judge, entered a take nothing judgment in favor of both defendants. Id. at 819-20. After
the trial court's plenary jurisdiction expired, Judge Johnson, sitting for Judge Gebhardt,
entered a nunc pro tunc judgment (on the plaintiff's motion) altering Judge Gebhardt's
judgment to reflect a take nothing judgment in favor of only one of the defendants. Id. at
820. At the hearing before Judge Johnson-on the plaintiff's motion to correct, reform or
modify the judgment-the plaintiff presented no evidence to prove that the judgment actu-
ally rendered by Judge Gebhardt was a take-nothing judgment in favor of only one of the
defendants and not both. Therefore, the court of appeals held that the Judge Johnson
abused his discretion in entering the judgment nunc pro tunc. Id. at 820-21. Since there
was no evidence to support any finding that the judgment rendered by Judge Gebhardt was
any different than the judgment contained in the written judgment signed by Judge Geb-
hardt, even if his rendition was in error, the error was judicial and could not be corrected
by a judgment nunc pro tunc. Id. at 821.
347. 919 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
348. Id. at 483. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals similarly affirmed a trial court's judg-
ment nunc pro tunc in Delaup v. Delaup, 917 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1996, no writ), where the record reflected that the trial judge orally adopted the parties'
agreed settlement and read the terms of the settlement into the record as the court's judg-
ment. Id. at 413. The final written judgment, however, omitted several key aspects of the
agreed settlement, thereby incorrectly stating the terms of the judgment rendered. Id.
"This," the court of appeals held, "is exactly the situation where a judgment nunc pro tunc
should be entered." Id.
349. 940 S.W.2d 594 (1996) (per curiam). The supreme court issued its opinion in Scott
& White on December 13, 1996, which is actually outside the Survey period. Nevertheless,
the authors have included this opinion because, in all respects material to this discussion,
the Dec. 13, 1996 opinion is identical to the court's original, but withdrawn, opinion issued
Aug. 16, 1996, which was within in the Survey period.
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Texas Rules of Civil Procedure even if the motion is not pending when a
nonsuit is filed. 350 The court of appeals concluded that the trial court
does not. The supreme court disagrees.
In Scott & White, the plaintiffs nonsuited a number of defendants. 351
The nonsuited defendants thereafter filed a motion for sanctions against
the plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.352 The trial court granted the motion for sanctions during its ple-
nary jurisdiction.353
Under Rule 162 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff may
take a non-suit at any time before introducing all of his evidence (other
than rebuttal evidence). 354 The rule further provides that a dismissal pur-
suant to a motion for nonsuit "shall have no effect on any motion for
sanctions .... pending at the time of dismissal .... -355 The court of
appeals in Scott & White interpreted this rule to mean that a trial court
does not have jurisdiction over a motion for sanctions filed after a party
has been nonsuited. 356 The court reasoned that, since Rule 162 speaks
only to the effects of a nonsuit on a motion for sanctions pending at the
time of dismissal, the trial court does not have jurisdiction over a later-
filed sanctions motion, even if ruled on while it maintains plenary
power.357 Reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court held that a
trial court's plenary power to act in a case does not expire until thirty
days after the judgment has been signed. 358 As a result, "the time during
which the trial court has authority to impose sanctions on such a motion
350. Scott & White, 940 S.W.2d at 595.
351. Id.
352. Rule 13 provides, in relevant part:
The signatures of attorneys or parties constitute a certificate by them that
they have read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of their
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry the in-
strument is not groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and
brought for the purpose of harassment. Attorneys or parties who shall bring
a fictitious suit as an experiment to get an opinion of the court, or who shall
file any fictitious pleading in a cause for such a purpose, or shall make state-
ments in pleading which they know to be groundless and false, for the pur-
pose of securing a delay of the trial of the cause, shall be held guilty of a
contempt. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, after notice and hear-
ing, shall impose an appropriate sanction available under Rule 215-2b, upon
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
353. Scott & White, 940 S.W.2d at 595.
354. TEX. R. Civ. P. 162.
355. Rule 162 provides, in relevant part:
At any time before the plaintiff has introduced all of his evidence other than
rebuttal evidence, the plaintiff may dismiss a case, or take a non-suit, which
shall be entered in the minutes. ...
... A dismissal under this rule shall have no effect on any motion for
sanctions, attorney's fees or other costs, pending at the time of dismissal, as
determined by the court.
Id.





is limited to when it retains plenary jurisdiction and is not limited by Rule
162."359 Rule 162, the court concluded, merely acknowledges that the
trial court's authority to act on a pending motion for sanctions is not af-
fected by a nonsuit-"it does not purport to limit the trial court's power
to act on motions filed after a nonsuit. ' 360
VIII. PERFECTION OF APPEAL
A. BONA FIDE ATTEMPT TO INVOKE APPELLATE
COURT'S JURISDICrION
The supreme court's holding in Linwood v. NCNB Texas361-that an
appellant who attempts to perfect his appeal by incorrectly filing a notice
of appeal, instead of filing a cost bond, nonetheless timely perfects his
appeal because he filed an instrument in "a bona fide attempt to invoke
the appellate court's jurisdiction" 362-has recently been extended. The
Austin Court of Appeals in Aguirre v. Texas Department of Protective &
Regulatory Services363 held that the filing of a defective affidavit of inabil-
ity to pay costs of appeal is sufficient to invoke an appellate court's juris-
diction.364 The appellant's affidavit of inability to pay costs of appeal was
defective in Aguirre because she failed to give notice of the filing of the
affidavit to the court reporter and appellee within two days after filing the
affidavit, as required under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 365
Although the court of appeals agreed with the appellee that the appellant
could not proceed by affidavit due to her failure to give notice of the
filing of the affidavit within two days, the court disagreed that she was
required to file security or costs by the ninety-day deadline to perfect her
appeal.366 The court of appeals concluded:
we see no reason why an appellant who files an affidavit, which is an
appropriate instrument by which to perfect its appeal, but who fails
to give the two-day notice, should be worse off than an appellant
who mistakenly files a notice of appeal, which is a wholly inappropri-
ate means of perfecting its appeal.367
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. 885 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1994).
362. Id. at 103 (appellant who mistakenly files notice of appeal instead of cost bond and
files cost bond 53 days after judgment signed invokes appellate jurisdiction even though
appellant may have no legitimate reason to believe it could perfect by notice of appeal).
363. 917 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ) (per curiam).
364. Id. at 463-64.
365. The rules provide:
The appellant or his attorney shall give notice of the filing of the affidavit to
the opposing party or his attorney and to the court reporter of the court
where the case was tried within two days after the filing; otherwise, he shall
not be entitled to prosecute the appeal without paying the costs or giving
security therefor.
TEX. R. App. P. 40(a)(3)(B).
366. Aguirre, 917 S.W.2d at 463. The appellant filed a motion for new trial, extending
the deadline to perfect the appeal to ninety days after judgment. Id.; TEX. R. App. P.
41 (a)(2).
367. Id. at 464.
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The court held that the appellant needed only to amend the defective
affidavit by posting bond or depositing cash. 368
Although a bona fide attempt to perfect an appeal properly invokes the
appellate court's jurisdiction, the failure to correct a defect in the perfect-
ing document can result in a dismissal of the appeal. For example, the
court of appeals accepted jurisdiction over the appeal in Griffin v. Office
of the Attorney GeneraP69 when the appellant improperly attempted to
perfect his appeal by filing a notice of appeal instead of a cost bond, cash
deposit, or affidavit of indigency. The court then dismissed the appeal
after the appellant ignored the court's order directing him to file a proper
perfecting instrument.370
B. PREMATURELY FILED DOCUMENTS
Under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant may avoid
paying the costs of an appeal by filing an affidavit disclosing his lack of
financial resources. 371 The affidavit must be filed with the court clerk
within thirty days after the judgment is signed or within ninety days from
the execution of judgment if a motion for new trial is filed or a timely
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law.372 The rules also re-
quire the party appealing in forma pauperis to notify the court reporter of
the filing of the affidavit "within two days after" the affidavit is filed, or
lose his opportunity to proceed as such.373 Any affidavit of indigency that
is prematurely filed "shall be deemed to have been filed on the date of
but subsequent to the time of signing of the judgment or the time of the
overruling of motion for new trial, if such a motion is filed." 374
368. Id.
369. 919 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
370. Griffin v. Office of the Attorney Gen., 926 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1996, no writ) (per curiam).
371. TEX. R. App. P. 40(a)(3)(A). Rule 40(a)(3)(A) provides:
When the appellant is unable to pay the cost of appeal or give security there-
for, he shall be entitled to prosecute an appeal or writ of error by filing with
the clerk, within the period prescribed by Rule 41, his affidavit stating that he
is unable to pay the costs of appeal or any part thereof, or to give security
therefor.
Id.
372. TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(1). Rule 41(a)(1) provides:
When security for costs on appeal is required, the bond or affidavit in lieu
thereof shall be filed with the clerk within thirty days after the judgment is
signed, or, within ninety days after the judgment is signed if a timely motion
for new trial has been filed by any party or if any party has timely filed a
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in a case tried without a
jury. If deposit of cash is made in lieu of bond, the same shall be made
within the same period.
Id.
373. TEX. R. App. P. 40(a)(3)(B).
374. TEX. R. App. P. 41(c). Rule 41(c) states, in pertinent part:
No appeal or bond or affidavit in lieu thereof, . . . shall be held ineffective
because prematurely filed. In civil cases, every such instrument shall be
deemed to have been filed on the date of but subsequent to the time of sign-
ing of the judgment or the time of the overruling of motion for new trial, if
such a motion is filed.
19971
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In Trevino v. Pemberton,375 the trial court signed the judgment on Sep-
tember 29, 1995.376 Eighteen days later, on October 17, 1995, the appel-
lants filed an affidavit of inability to pay appeal costs. 377 On October 25,
1995, the appellants filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by
operation of law on December 13, 1995.378 On December 14, 1995, the
appellants notified the court reporter, for the first time, of their affidavit
of inability that was filed on October 17, 1995.379 The court reporter re-
fused to prepare the statement of facts free of charge, asserting that the
appellants had failed to timely notify her of their October 17, 1995 affida-
vit.380 The trial court agreed with the court reporter, and refused to order
her to prepare the statement of facts free of charged. 381
On mandamus, the Amarillo Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial
court and court reporter, holding that the appellants notice was timely.
In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the two-day time frame
within which the appellant must give notice to the court reporter of the
filing of a pauper's affidavit does not run from the date on which the
affidavit is actually filed.38 2 Rather, if it is prematurely filed by the appel-
lant, the two-day period runs from the date on which the affidavit is
deemed filed under Rule 41(C). 38 3 As a result, since the appellants in
Trevino filed their pauper's affidavit before their motion for new trial was
overruled, the affidavit was deemed filed under Rule 41(c) the moment
after the motion for new trial was overruled, or December 13, 1995. 384
Since they gave the court reporter notice of the filing of the affidavit on
December 14, 1995, their notice was not late-it was made within the two
day time frame required by Rule 40(a)(3)(B). 385 Under the court's rea-
soning in Trevino, therefore, if filed prematurely, an appellant's notice of
filing an affidavit of inability to pay costs of appeal is timely even if given
some fifty-eight days after the date on which the affidavit was actually
filed.
In another case addressing the effect of a prematurely filed document,
the First Court of Appeals in Chunn v. Chunn386 held that an appeal
bond filed in violation of a bankruptcy automatic stay of judicial proceed-
ings against the debtor should not be treated as void or voidable, but
rather, as a prematurely filed document. 387 As a result, an appeal bond
Id.
375. 918 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
376. Id. at 103.
377. Id. at 103-04.








386. 929 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1996, habeas corpus writ
requested).
387. Id. at 493.
[Vol. 50
1997] APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
filed during the automatic stay is without legal effect during the pendency
of the stay, but is treated as immediately filed upon the lifting of the
stay.388 The court reasoned that "requir[ing] a party to file more, if not
identical, papers with the clerk when the automatic stay is lifted seems
pointless. 389
C. MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE COST BOND
1. "Reasonable Explanation"
Although Rule 41(a)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that a court of appeals may grant an extension of time for the
late filing of a cost bond if such bond is filed not later than fifteen days
after the last day allowed, the court may do So only if, "within the same
period, a motion is filed in the appellate court reasonably explaining the
need for such extension. ' 390 As the court of appeals in Velasquez v. Har-
rison391 held, a "reasonable explanation" for such extension of time does
not include the appellant's inability to anticipate that the trial court
would find that he did not file his affidavit of inability to pay costs on
appeal in good faith.392 Such a claim, the court reasoned, "could poten-
tially apply in every such case, and the rule would therefore be effectively
neutralized. ,,393
2. Failure to Request Extension
In the past, some courts of appeals have held that the late filing of a
cost bond or notice of appeal within the fifteen-day grace period without
a motion for extension of time is a procedural irregularity that could be
corrected under Rule 83, and that a motion for extension of time can be
implied.394 The San Antonio Court of Appeals disagrees and, in a re-
388. Id. at 493-94. The court's holding in this regard is directly contrary to the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals' holding in Nautical Landings Marina, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank,
791 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied) (holding that appeal
bond filed during automatic stay is void).
389. Chunn, 929 S.W.2d at 493-94.
390. TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(2). Rule 41(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
An extension of time may be granted by the appellate court for late filing of
a cost bond or notice of appeal ... if such bond or notice of appeal is filed,
... not later than fifteen days after the last day allowed and, within the same
period, a motion is filed in the appellate court reasonably explaining the
need for such extension.
Id.
391. 934 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, n.w.h.) (per curiam).
392. Id. at 770. A "reasonable explanation," the court held, is "any plausible statement
of circumstances that indicates that the failure to timely file was not deliberate or inten-
tional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake, or mischance." Id. The court went on
to state that "[any conduct short of deliberate or intentional noncompliance qualifies as
inadvertence, mistake, or mischance, even if that conduct constitutes professional negli-
gence." Id.
393. Id.
394. See Sanchez v. State, 885 S.W.2d 444, 445-46 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no
pet.). Rule 83 provides, in pertinent part:
A judgment shall not be affirmed or reversed or an appeal dismissed for
defects or irregularities, in appellate procedure, either of form or substance,
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markably harsh move under the circumstances, dismissed the appeal in
Verburgt v. Dorner395 for lack of a motion for extension of time.
In Verburgt, the appellant's incorrect method of calculating his cost
bond deadline caused him to file his cost bond four days late. 396 Because
he believed that his cost bond was timely, the appellant did not file a
motion for extension of time. 397 As accurately cast by the court of ap-
peals, the issue on appeal was "whether the appellate rules condone a
result that allows a litigant who knows he is late with his bond to save his
appeal, but rejects the appeal of the litigant who erroneously, but in good
faith, believes he has timely filed his bond and, thus satisfied, also be-
lieves he has no need to file for an extension of time. ' 398 Recognizing the
"patent unfairness of such a result," the court nevertheless concluded that
the failure to file a timely motion for extension of time "is a jurisdictional
defect that cannot be cured. '399 "[S]ometimes," the court commented,
"the effect of strict application of the appellate deadlines is unavoidably
harsh." 400
The dissent argued that the appellant's failure to file a motion to ex-
tend the time for perfecting his appeal is "plainly a defect or irregularity
in appellate procedure," requiring the court under Rule 83 to provide the
appellant with an opportunity to correct within a specified, reasonable
period of time.401 The dissent further asserted that the majority's holding
not only conflicts with Rule 83 but also with Rule 2(a), which provides
that the rules of procedure "shall not be construed to ... limit the juris-
diction of the courts of appeals .... ,,402
without allowing a reasonable time to correct or amend such defects or irreg-
ularities ....
TEX. R. App. P. 83. See also Boulos v. State, 775 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1989, pet. ref'd); Jiles v. State, 751 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988,
pet. ref'd).
395. 928 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ granted) (en banc).
396. Id. at 655. Actually, the appellant was just one day off in his calculation but, since
the day after the correct deadline was a Friday holiday preceding a weekend, the appellant
did not file his cost bond until the following Monday, making the bond four days late. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 656. In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that some courts of
appeals had previously accepted jurisdiction in such cases under the "procedural irregular-
ity" exception to Rule 83. Verburgt, 928 S.W.2d at 656. The court determined, however,
that the Court of Criminal Appeals' recent decision in Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996) overrides the previous courts of appeals' decisions. The court in Olivo
held that "[w]hen a notice of appeal is filed within the fifteen-day period but no timely
motion for extension of time is filed, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction." Id. at 522.
400. Verburgt, 928 S.W.2d at 656.
401. Id. at 657 (Duncan, J., dissenting).
402. Id. Rule 2(a) states: "These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the
jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, the Court of Criminal Appeals or the Supreme Court
as established by law." TEX. R. App. P. 2(a). In accord with its decision in Verburgt, the
San Antonio court similarly refused a late-filed cost bond in Kleck Mechanical, Inc. v. Pack
Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ). In that
case, the district clerk's written notice of judgment erroneously stated that the judgment
was signed three days later than the date it was actually signed. Id. at 191. Nonetheless,
the appellants filed a timely motion for new trial. Id. The appellants failed, however, to
file their cost bond on time and they did not request an extension of time for filing their
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D. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
When a judgment creditor proceeds under the Uniform Enforcement
of Judgments Act (UEJA),403 the filing of the foreign judgment consti-
tutes both the judgment creditor's original petition and a final judg-
ment.4°4 If the judgment creditor's original petition complies with the
UEJA in all respects, it becomes a final, appealable Texas judgment on
the date it is filed, and the appellate timetable begins to run on the filing
date.40 5
IX. TRANSFERRING THE APPEAL
Texas is the only state in the union that has geographically overlapping
appellate districts.406 In addition to other problems, these overlapping
districts occasionally create jurisdictional conflicts, as seen in Miles v.
Ford Motor Co.40 7 The product liability case in Miles was tried in Rusk
County.408 Judgments rendered by courts in Rusk County may be ap-
pealed to either the Texarkana or Tyler Courts of Appeals.409 Prior to
trial, the Rusk County trial court rendered a partial summary judgment
against the plaintiffs on some of their claims, which the plaintiffs immedi-
ately-albeit prematurely-appealed to the Texarkana Court of Ap-
peals.410 The defendants did not move to dismiss the premature appeal
and the Texarkana appellate court took no action relating to the appeal
prior to the plaintiffs' filing of a timely appeal bond from the subsequent
cost bond. Id. They claimed on appeal that their failure to timely perfect was due entirely
to the district clerk's erroneous representation of the date the judgment was signed. Id.
The San Antonio court was not sympathetic and refused the late-filed bond. It commented
that appellants had probably seen a copy of the judgment reflecting the date it was signed,
since their motion for new trial attacked the merits of the judgment. Id. at 192.
403. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-.008 (Vernon 1986).
404. Walnut Equip. Leasing Co., Inc. v. Wu, 920 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tex. 1996) (per
curiam).
405. Id.
406. See Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 914 S.W.2d 135, 139 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
407. Id. For example, the bench and bar in counties served by overlapping appellate
districts are "subjected to uncertainty from conflicting legal authority." Id. at 139. Over-
lapping districts additionally create the potential for unfair forum shopping and permit
voters of some counties to elect a disproportionate number of justices. Id.
408. Id. at 136.
409. The Texas Government Code provides, in relevant part:
(a) The state is divided into 14 courts of appeals districts with a court of
appeals in each district.
(g) The Sixth Court of Appeals District [in Texarkana] is composed of the
counties of Bowie, Campe, Cass, Delta, Fannin, Franklin, Gregg, Harrison,
Hopkins, Hunt, Lamar, Marion, Morris, Panola, Red River, Rusk, Titus, Up-
shur, and Wood.
(in) The Twelfth Court of Appeals District [in Tyler] is composed of the
counties of Anderson, Cherokee, Gregg, Henderson, Hopkins, Houston,
Kaufman, Nacogdoches, Panola, Rains, Rusk, Sabine, San Augustine, Shelby,
Smith, Upshur, Van Zandt, and Wood.
See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.201(a), (g), (in) (Vernon 1988) (emphasis added).




At trial on the plaintiffs' remaining claims, the jury found in favor of
the plaintiffs on all but one claim, and the trial court rendered judgment
against defendants in excess of $37 million. 412 On the date the judgment
was signed, the plaintiffs perfected an appeal to the Texarkana Court of
Appeals, complaining of the trial court's summary judgment and the
jury's verdict against the plaintiff on one claim.413 Ten days later, the
defendants perfected an appeal to the Tyler Court of Appeals, which the
plaintiffs moved to dismiss on the basis that the Texarkana Court of Ap-
peals had already acquired dominant jurisdiction over the entire ap-
peal.414 The defendants subsequently filed a motion in the Texarkana
Court of Appeals requesting a transfer of the plaintiffs' appeal to the
Tyler court.4 15 The Texarkana court then forwarded the defendants' mo-
tion to transfer to the Texas Supreme Court.416
Considering the motion to transfer appeal, the supreme court reviewed
applicable law. All challenges to the trial court's judgment, the court
confirmed, should be heard together in one appellate proceeding.417 To
ensure consolidated review of such judgments, the supreme court, and
that court alone, has authority to transfer appellate cases when, in its
opinion, there is "good cause" for the transfer.418 However, the general
rule of dominant jurisdiction, which applies routinely at the trial court
level, applies equally to appeals in those instances where the legislature
has not otherwise provided an allocation mechanism.419 Once the first
appeal is perfected, therefore, the "court [of appeals] acquire[s] dominant
jurisdiction over the entire appeal. '420
Applying these rules to the facts of Miles, the supreme court rejected
the defendants' argument that "good cause" existed because their appeal
was "primary" (it was the appeal from the $37 million judgment while the
plaintiffs' appeal related to claims worth, at most, a small percentage of
that amount).4 21 Rather, the court held, in determining whether "good
cause" exists, "the rule of dominant jurisdiction should control. '422
411. Id.





417. Id. at 138.
418. Id. at 137. The Texas Government Code provides that
The supreme court may order cases transferred from one court of appeals to
another at any time that, in the opinion of the supreme court, there is good
cause for the transfer.
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1988).
419. Miles, 914 S.W.2d at 137 ("the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts").
420. Id.
421. Id. at 138-39.
422. Id. As explained by the court in Miles, in determining whether to grant a motion
to transfer an appeal, the supreme court needs to have before it (1) the motion to transfer,(2) any briefs in support of the transfer, and (3) any objections of the two courts of appeals
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An appellant cannot circumvent the rule set forth in Miles-that juris-
diction lies in the appellate court where the appeal is first perfected-by
changing his proper designation from one appellate court to another after
perfecting the appeal in the first, under the guise of amending the cost
bond.423 Although an appellant has the right to amend a defective appeal
bond in order to properly perfect an appeal, an appellant in overlapping
appellate districts does not have the right to amend his appeal bond to
name a different court of appeals.4 24
X. THE RECORD ON APPEAL
A. INABILITY TO OBTAIN COMPLETE STATEMENT OF FACTS
Under the rules of appellate procedure, a party who is unable to obtain
a complete statement of facts for appellate review is entitled to a new
trial.425 To qualify for a new trial, however, the statement of facts must
be unobtainable due to the fact that the court reporter's notes and
records were "lost or destroyed. '426 This presupposes that notes were
actually made, then either lost or destroyed after coming into exist-
ence. 427 As a result, an appellant who is unable to obtain a complete
statement of facts due to the fact that the court reporter was excused
from the courtroom by both parties when the testimony missing from the
statement of facts was given is not entitled to a new trial.42 8 As held by
the court in Lascurain, "[c]ounsel cannot keep silent when the court re-
porter openly leaves the courtroom and thereby guarantee his client a
new trial. 429
B. FAILURE TO REQUEST EXTENSION OF TIME FOR BOTH
TRANSCRIPT AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
A motion to extend time operates as a basis for extending the time to
file the entire record only where the motion includes a request for both
to the transfer. Id. at 137 n.2. The proper procedure for presenting a motion to transfer to
the supreme court, therefore, is to file a copy of the motion to transfer as well as any briefs
in support of the transfer in each of the two courts of appeals, and request that, when the
motion and any briefs are forwarded to the supreme court, each court of appeals advise the
supreme court in writing whether it has any objection to the proposed transfer. Id.
423. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 928 S.W.2d 226, 228
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, n.w.h.).
424. Id.
425. TEX. R. App. P. 50(e). Under Rule 50(e):
When the record or any portion thereof is lost or destroyed it may be substi-
tuted in the trial court and when so substituted the record may be prepared
and transmitted to the appellate court as in other cases. If the appellant has
made a timely request for a statement of facts, but the court reporter's notes
and records have been lost or destroyed without appellant's fault, the appel-
lant is entitled to a new trial unless the parties agree on a statement of facts.
Id. See Lascurain v. Crowley, 917 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
426. Lascurain, 917 S.W.2d at 344.
427. Id




the transcript and statement of facts. As a result, a motion to extend the
time to file the statement of facts alone does not extend the time for filing
the record nor does it alter the due date for the transcript. In Jarrell v.
Serfass,430 the record was originally due September 8, 1995. Because ap-
pellant had obtained an extension of time (until December 6, 1995) to file
the statement of facts, she argued that the record was not due until the
statement of facts was due. Therefore, she argued, her December 12,
1995 motion to extend the time for filing the transcript was timely, having
been filed "not later than fifteen days after the last date for filing the
record. '431 The Waco Court of Appeals rejected the appellant's argu-
ment, reasoning that because her original motion to extend time referred
only to the statement of facts, the extension applied only to the statement
of facts. '432
C. REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FILED IN WRONG
APPELLATE COURT
In Birmingham Fire Insurance Co. v. American National Fire Insurance
Co.,433 the appellants brought suit in the Texarkana Court of Appeals but
filed their request for extension of time to file the record with the Tyler
Court of Appeals. 434 The Texarkana Court of Appeals noted that the
general rule is that "[a]n instrument is deemed as filed with the proper
clerk of an appellate court once it is received by the clerk's agent. '435
The court then stated that it would be "appropriate to consider the clerk
of the [Tyler Court of Appeals] as the agent of this court for purposes of
receiving and filing these motions, and we therefore consider the motions
to extend time to file the record that were filed in that court as having
been filed here. '436
430. 916 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. App.- Waco 1996, no writ) (per curiam).
431. Id. at 720-21. See TEX. R. App. P. 54(c), which provides, in pertinent part:
An extension of time may be granted for late filing in a court of appeals of a
transcript or statement of facts, if a motion reasonably explaining the need
therefor is filed by appellant with the court of appeals not later than fifteen
days after the last date for filing the record.
Id.
432. Jarrell, 916 S.W.2d at 721. The court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that it
could not review the trial court's judgment with only the statement of facts. Id. The court
reasoned that without the transcript, it could not determine if the appellant had properly
preserved her factual sufficiency complaints, or even if she properly perfected the appeal
so as to invoke the court's appellate jurisdiction. Id.
433. 928 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ).
434. Id. at 227. The appeal could have been taken to either the TIyler or Texarkana
Courts of Appeals, since the trial court in Birmingham Fire sits in geographically overlap-
ping appellate districts. Id.
435. Id. at 229.
436. Id.
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D. APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO HAVE STATEMENT OF FACTs PREPARED
PRIOR TO PAYMENT
When the appellant has filed a cost bond and made a proper request
for a statement of facts, a court reporter may not demand a deposit
before beginning the preparation of the statement of facts.437 The rules
of appellate procedure require only that an appellant pay or make ar-
rangements to pay the court reporter when the court reporter completes
and delivers the statement of facts.438 The court reporter may, however,
move to increase the amount of the cost bond if she believes that the
bond posted by the appellant is insufficient to cover the estimated costs of
the statement of facts. 439
E. TAMPERING WITH THE RECORD
An appellant who purposely alters an appellate record fails to meet his
burden to present a sufficient record on appeal showing error requiring
reversal.440 Accompanying an appellant's right to appellate review is
"the duty to provide an accurate record sufficient for the appellate court
to perform its function to determine the correctness of the lower court's
judgment."' 1 Thus, when an appellant purposely alters an appellate rec-
ord, "he fails by his own actions to provide the appellate court with a
sufficient record.""42
XI. THE BRIEF ON APPEAL
During the Survey period, the supreme court reaffirmed that a so-
called "Malooly" point of error-a point of error stating generally that
the trial court erred by granting summary judgment-"is sufficient to pre-
serve error and to allow argument as to all possible grounds upon which
437. Easton v. Creeks, 921 S.W.2d 449, 450 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (citing Grossnickle v. Turner, 903 S.W.2d 362, 364 n.2 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1995, orig. proceeding) and Jackson v. Crawford, 715 S.W.2d 130, 131
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (interlocutory order)).
438. Id. See TEX. R. App. P. 46(e). Rule 46(e) provides: "Even if a bond is filed or
deposit in lieu of bond is made, appellant shall either pay or make arrangements to pay the
court reporter upon completion and delivery of the statement of facts." Id.
439. Easton, 921 S.W.2d at 450 (citing Vickery v. Porche, 848 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ) (interlocutory order)).
440. Okere v. Apex Fin. Corp., 930 S.W.2d 146, 152 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, writ de-
nied); TEX. R. App. P. 50(d). Rule 50(d) provides: "The burden is on the appellant, or
other party seeking review, to see that a sufficient record is presented to show error requir-
ing reversal." Id.
441. Okere, 930 S.W.2d at 152.
442. IL The pro se appellant in Okere (1) inserted loose documents into the transcript,
(2) highlighted portions of the transcript, (3) inserted handwritten annotations and interlin-
eations into the statement of facts, (4) inserted at least one exhibit into the original volume
of exhibits prepared by the court reporter, (5) altered testimony as recorded in the state-
ment of facts, and (6) altered transcript documents. Id. The Dallas Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial court's judgment and referred the record in the matter to the office of the
district attorney, noting that tampering with a governmental record under certificate or




summary judgment should have been denied. '443 If a general Malooly
point of error is sufficient to attack all possible grounds supporting a trial
court's summary judgment, does an appellant who advances a Malooly
point of error have to specifically present argument in his brief attacking
all grounds advanced in support of summary judgment or else be deemed
to have waived error in any grounds not argued? No, according to the
Texarkana Court of Appeals, which faced this issue in Stevens v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co.444
In Stevens, the appellant asserted a general Malooly point of error
complaining that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
The court's order granting summary judgment did not specify the grounds
on which it was granted, although several grounds had been asserted. On
appeal, the appellant stated that the trial court had granted the summary
judgment on limitations grounds and, in his brief, limited his argument to
that defense.445 The appellee argued that the court of appeals was re-
quired to affirm the summary judgment because the trial court could have
granted the judgment on a ground not argued by the appellant. 446 Re-
jecting the appellee's argument, the court of appeals held that an appel-
lant who raises a general Malooly point of error does not waive error in a
trial court's summary judgment by failing to argue against all grounds
which could possibly support the summary judgment.447 A general Ma-
looly point of error, the court noted, "is a request for the appellate court
to conduct a de novo review of the trial court's judgment." 448 As a result,
the court of appeals can, "as a practical matter, step into the trial court's
shoes and ... by reviewing the pleadings and evidence as raised in the
motion and response, determine whether the trial court properly granted
judgment." 449
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals noted that summary judg-
ment cases differ from non-summary judgment cases to which the briefing
443. Plexchem Int'l, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 922 S.W.2d 930, 930-31 (Tex.
1996) (per curiam) (citing Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970)).
444. 929 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied).
445. Id. at 669.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 669-70.
448. Id. at 670.
449. Id. The Texarkana court acknowledged that its holding in this regard is in conflict
with a number of other courts of appeals. Id. (citing Maranatha Temple, Inc. y. Enterprise
Prods. Co., 893 S.W.2d 92, 106 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Bradt v.
West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 68-69 (Tex. App.-Houston flst Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Martin v.
Cohen, 804 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ); A.C. Collins Ford,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 807 S.W.2d 755, 760 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied) (opin-
ion on rehearing)).
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requirements of Rule 74(f)450 apply.451 Further, the court noted that on
appeal "the summary judgment movant has the burden of demonstrating
it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."'452 Thus, the appellee is
deemed to have waived a ground by not arguing it on appeal, the movant
is relieved of its burden "even though Malooly seems to allow a single
general point of error to bring all possible grounds into issue. '453 Taking
such a rule to its logical extension, the court concluded, would require the
court to affirm the summary judgment "even if the trial court erred on a
ground not argued on appeal, and even though the general point of error
is sufficient to attack all grounds. '454
Notably, although the Texarkana court in Stevens cited to the supreme
court's opinion in Plexchem for the general proposition that a Malooly
point of error is sufficient to preserve error on all possible grounds, the
Texarkana court failed to discuss two significant aspects of Plexchem.
First, in Plexchem the supreme court held that Malooly language is "suffi-
cient to preserve error and to allow argument as to all possible grounds
upon which summary judgment should have been denied. ' 455 Second,
the appellant in Plexchem did not waive any error because, in addition to
using Malooly language in its point of error, it "presented three pages of
argument and authorities on this issue in its brief. '456 In fact, the
supreme court's specific holding in Plexchem is that "[the appellant's Ma-
looly] point of error and accompanying briefing were adequate to pre-
serve error on [the] issue.457
XII. COMMUNICATIONS WITH COURT STAFF
Rule 6 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that: "cor-
respondence or other communications relative to any matter before the
court must be conducted with the clerk and shall not be addressed to or
conducted with any of the justices or judges or other members of the
court's staff. '458 Further, the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct provide that "a lawyer shall not communicate ex parte with a
court for the purpose of influencing the court or person concerning a
pending matter other than orally upon adequate notice to opposing coun-
450. Rule 74(f) states, in relevant part:
A brief of the argument may present separately or grouped the points relied
upon for reversal. The argument shall include: (1) a fair, condensed state-
ment of the facts pertinent to such points, with reference to the pages in the
record where the same may be found; and (2) such discussion of the facts and
the authorities relied upon as may be requisite to maintain the point at issue.
TEX. R. App. P. 74(f).
451. Stevens, 929 S.W.2d at 669.
452. Id
453. Id at 669-70.
454. Id. at 670.
455. Plexchem, 922 S.W.2d at 931 (emphasis added).
456. Id.
457. Id. (emphasis added).
458. TEX. R. App. P. 6.
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sel or to the adverse party if he is not represented by a lawyer. ' 459 Ap-
plying these rules, the El Paso Court of Appeals recently held that
"[p]rivate communications between a lawyer in a pending action and a
staff member of an appellate court before whom a case is pending con-
cerning the merits of the then pending appeal are 'ex parte communica-
tions' not authorized by law."'460
In J.B.K., an attorney, after presenting an appellate brief and oral argu-
ment in a case, telephoned an acquaintance who was a staff member of
the appellate court before whom the appeal was pending "for the purpose
of inquiring ... as to what his 'chances' were in the [appeal] and whether
he should 'settle' his case prior to the [court of appeals' decision]. '461
Holding that the attorneys' conduct violated the rules of appellate proce-
dure as well as the disciplinary rules, the court found, as a matter of law,
that "any attempt to solicit or receive information on the merits of a
pending case from a staff member of an appellate court constitutes an
impermissible ex parte communication with chambers. ' 462
XIII. FRIVOLOUS APPEALS
Several cases this Survey period reflect a growing concern over the fil-
ing of frivolous appeals. In three cases, Campos v. Investment Manage-
ment Properties, Inc.,463 Jim Arnold Corp. v. Bishop,464 and Jackson v.
Biotectronics, Inc.,465 the courts of appeals sanctioned the appellant
under Rule 84 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.4 66 To deter-
mine whether an appeal has been taken for purposes of delay and with-
out sufficient cause under Rule 84, the court of appeals must "review the
record from the point of view of an advocate and ascertain whether ap-
pellant had reasonable grounds to believe that the case would be
459. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCr 3.05(b)(3) (1995), reprinted in TEX. Gov'r
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (Vernon Supp. 1992).
460. In re J.B.K., 931 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
461. Id. at 583.
462. Id. at 584. The El Paso Court of Appeals forwarded a copy of their opinion to the
Office of the General Counsel, State Bar of Texas, for "investigation and any action it
deems warranted." Id. at 585.
463. 917 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
464. 928 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, no writ).
465. 937 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]) 1996, n.w.h.). The Fourteenth
Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Jackson on December 5, 1996, which is actually
outside the Survey period. Nevertheless, the authors have included this opinion because,
in all respects material to this discussion, the December 5, 1996 opinion is identical to the
court's original, but withdrawn, opinion issued August 29, 1996, which was within in the
Survey period.
466. TEX. R. APP. P. 84; Campos, 917 S.W.2d at 353; Jim Arnold, 928 S.W.2d at 772;
Jackson, 937 S.W.2d at 46. Rule 84 states, in pertinent part:
In civil cases where the court of appeals shall determine that an appellant has
taken an appeal for delay and without sufficient cause, then the court may, as
part of its judgment, award each prevailing appellee an amount not to exceed
ten percent of the amount of damages awarded to such appellee as damages
against such appellant.
TEX. R. APP. P. 84.
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reversed." 467
In Campos, the plaintiff appealed from a summary judgment rendered
in favor of the defendant. 468 The plaintiff, however, had filed his re-
sponse to the defendant's motion for summary judgment late and never
sought leave from the trial court to file the late response.4 69 As a result,
the trial court did not consider the response in rendering summary judg-
ment and, therefore, the only evidence before the court of appeals was
the defendant's evidence in support of summary judgment. 470 Nonethe-
less, the plaintiff urged on appeal that a fact issue existed precluding sum-
mary judgment.471 Moreover, in his appellate brief, the plaintiff overtly
embellished pertinent statutory language, which constituted a material
misrepresentation to the court of appeals "clearly calculated to induce a
reversal of [the] summary judgment appeal. ' 472 The court of appeals as-
sessed Rule 84 sanctions against the appellant for filing what was a pa-
tently frivolous appeal. 473
However, as seen in Jim Arnold and Jackson, courts of appeals are ap-
parently prepared to sanction appellants under facts significantly less
egregious than those seen in Campos. In Jim Arnold, Rule 84 sanctions
were assessed because the appellant's "statement, arguments, and cited
authorities are minimal, and authorities cited only tenuously relate to ap-
pellant's claimed points of error.. . . "-474 Similarly, in Jackson, the appel-
lant was sanctioned because his "points of error contain[ed] little or no
authority, and in most instances, when he did cite authority, it was off
point. 475
XIV. SPECIAL APPEALS
A. THE LIMITED APPEAL
As the appellant in Brown v. Brown476 discovered, under certain cir-
cumstances, the limited appeal provision of the rules of appellate proce-
dure create a trap for the unwary. As is typical in family law cases, the
child custody issues in Brown were tried to a jury while the proceedings
relating to child support and property division were tried to the judge.4 77
467. Jim Arnold, 928 S.W.2d at 772; Campos, 917 S.W.2d at 356; Jackson, 937 S.W.2d at
46.
468. Campos, 917 S.W.2d at 353.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 353-55.
471. Id. at 354-55.
472. Id. at 358 (Green, J., concurring).
473. Id. at 353.
474. Jim Arnold, 928 S.W.2d at 772. Justice Stover dissented, disagreeing with the ma-
jority's conclusion that the case was frivolous. Id. at 772-73 (Stover, J., dissenting).
475. Jackson, 937 S.W.2d at 46.
476. 917 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
477. Brown, 917 S.W.2d at 359-60. As the concurring justice noted in Brown, the rea-
son for this bifurcation in family law cases is obvious: "the trial court may not enter a
decree that contravenes the jury verdict concerning the appointment of a managing conser-
vator" and "a jury finding in response to an inquiry concerning the division of property
upon divorce is advisory only." Id. at 360-61 (McClure, J., concurring).
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Mrs. Brown appealed only from the trial court's rulings on property divi-
sion and child support; she did not appeal the jury's child custody find-
ings.478 In her statement of facts on appeal, she included only the non-
jury proceedings relating to the issues tried to the court. She did not,
however, include the testimony and evidence presented in the child cus-
tody determination tried to the jury.479 As a result, she did not comply
with the provisions of Rule 53(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, which, if she wished to pursue a limited appeal, required her to (1)
include in her request for the statement of facts the points of error she
intended to assert on appeal, (2) ask that the notice of limitation be in-
cluded in the appellate transcript, and (3) notify the other parties of the
limitation of the record.480
The El Paso Court of Appeals reluctantly held that, as a result of her
failure to comply with Rule 53, the entire case was before the appellate
court, requiring the court to presume that the omitted statement of facts
from the separate jury trial on child custody "provide the evidence to
support the trial court's implied findings and judgment on property divi-
sion and child support."'481 As most succinctly stated by the concurrence,
"[t]he result, while harsh, is inescapable. '482
B. APPEAL BY WRIT OF ERROR
Appeal by writ of error is reserved for those who did not participate
"in the actual trial of the case in the trial court. '483 Whether a party
"participated" in the actual trial has been the subject of much dispute-
until this Survey period. In Texaco, Inc. v. Central Power & Light Co. 484
and Withem v. Underwood,485 the supreme court granted writ to "clarify
the requirements for an appeal by writ of error." The supreme court ex-
plained that "participation" means:
478. Id. at 359-60.
479. Id. at 360.
480. Id. Rule 53(d) provides:
If appellant requests or prepares a partial statement of facts, he shall include
in his request or proposal a statement of the points to be relied on and shall
thereafter be limited to such points. If such statement is filed, there shall be
a presumption on appeal that nothing omitted from the record is relevant to
any of the points specified or to the disposition of the appeal. Any other
party may designate additional portions of the evidence to be included in the
statement of facts.
TEX. R. App. P. 53(d).
481. Brown, 917 S.W.2d at 360.
482. Id. at 365 (McClure, J., concurring).
483. TEX. R. App. P. 45(b). Appeal by writ of error requires that the appellant "(1) file
the petition for writ of error within six months of the signing of the final judgment, (2) be a
party to the lawsuit, (3) have not participated in the actual trial of the case, and (4) show
error on the face of the record." Withem v. Underwood, 922 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. 1996)
(per curiam) (emphasis added). Rule 45(b) provides: "No party who participates either in
person or by his attorney in the actual trial of the case in the trial court shall be entitled to
review by the court of appeals through means of writ of error." TEX. R. App. P. 45(b).
484. 925 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1996).
485. 922 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
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taking part in a hearing in open court, leading up to the rendition of
judgment on the questions of law, if the case is disposed of on the
questions of law, or on the questions of fact, if the final judgment is
rendered on the facts. The statute was intended to cut off the right
of appeal by writ of error of those who participate in the hearing in
open court in the trial that leads to final judgment.486
The issue in determining "participation" is "whether the appellant has
participated in 'the decision-making event' that results in judgment adju-
dicating the appellant's rights. '' 487 Moreover, whether an appellant is en-
titled to appeal by writ of error is determined not by whether the
appellant's failure to "participate" in the decision-making event was due
to the appellant's negligence or absent of diligence, but, rather, by
whether the appellant in fact did not participate in the decision-making
event that results in judgment adjudicating his rights. 488
After announcing ready on the first day of trial, Texaco (one of the two
defendants in the underlying case) settled with the plaintiffs.489 The trial
court approved the settlement and, apparently under the impression that
the settlement ended Texaco's involvement in the case, told Texaco's at-
torney to go home.490 Texaco's attorney did so and did not attend the
remainder of the trial between the plaintiffs and the other defendant,
Central Power & Light (CP&L).491 CP&L, however, filed a motion on
the last day of trial asking the court to take judicial notice of a tariff that
allegedly established Texaco's duty to indemnify CP&L.492 CP&L served
the motion on Texaco's lawyers. 493 After the jury returned a verdict find-
ing CP&L partially negligent, the trial court entered a judgment reciting
that CP&L had established entitlement to indemnification from Texaco
by virtue of the tariff and ordered Texaco to completely indemnify CP&L
for all amounts due to the plaintiffs under the judgment. 494 Almost six
months postjudgment, Texaco sought to appeal by writ of error to the San
Antonio Court of Appeals, which held that Texaco's participation in the
trial was sufficient to cause Texaco to be barred from appealing by writ of
error.
495
The supreme court disagreed, holding that the "decision-making event"
that resulted in judgment adjudicating Texaco's rights was the plaintiffs'
jury trial establishing liability against CP&L.496 Thus, despite the fact
that Texaco may have appeared generally in the trial of the case by an-
486. Withem, 922 S.W.2d at 957; see Texaco, 925 S.W.2d at 589.
487. Texaco, 925 S.W.2d at 589; see Withem, 922 S.W.2d at 957.
488. Texaco, 925 S.W.2d at 590 ("[I]t is the fact of nonparticipation, not the reason for
it, that determines the right to appeal by writ of error." (emphasis in original)).




493. Id. at 587-88.
494. Id. at 588.
495. Id. See Texaco, Inc. v. Central Power & Light Co., 897 S.W.2d 854, 863-64 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1995), rev'd, 925 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1996).
496. Texaco, 925 S.W.2d at 590.
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nouncing ready for trial and by appearing before the court to announce
the settlement with the plaintiffs, Texaco did not in fact attend or partici-
pate in the jury trial establishing liability against CP&L and was therefore
entitled to appeal by writ of error.497
C. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
1. Perfecting the Administrative Appeal
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a party aggrieved by
an administrative agency's order must file a timely motion for rehearing
to the administrative agency prior to filing an appeal to the district
court. 498 The administrative agency then has forty-five days to act on a
motion for rehearing before it is overruled by operation of law.499 Once
the motion for rehearing is overruled, whether by the agency or by opera-
tion of law, the appellant has thirty days to file a petition to initiate judi-
cial review.500 Although the administrative agency has an obligation to
notify an appellant upon issuing an order overruling a motion for rehear-
ing,501 the agency has no obligation to notify the appellant that his motion
for rehearing was overruled by operation of law.5 0 2 Further, the agency's
failure to give such notice will not excuse an appellant's failure to timely
appeal the agency's order within thirty days of the overruling of the mo-
tion for rehearing.50 3 The appellant has an obligation to note the passage
of forty-five days and timely file his appeal.504
As the dentist/appellant in Simmons v. State Board of Dental Examin-
ers505 discovered, under some circumstances, an administrative appeal
might be late even if all time frames under the APA are carefully consid-
ered. Specifically, although the APA governs dentists' disciplinary ac-
tions and appeals, the Dental Practice Act (DPA) is also applicable.
Under the DPA, a dentist has thirty days from the date of a license-revo-
cation notice to seek judicial review in district court. 5 6 Thus, under the
DPA, a dentist appealing an order of the State Board of Dental Examin-
ers (the Board) revoking his license must file his appeal within thirty days
497. Id. In Withem, counsel for one of two co-defendants filed an answer on behalf of
his client as well as the other defendant, Withem, whose whereabouts were unknown.
Withem, 922 S.W.2d at 957. The trial court rendered judgment against Withem. Id. The
attorney who had filed the answer on behalf of Withem next filed a petition for writ of
error in the Dallas Court of Appeals on Withem's behalf. Id. The Dallas Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, finding that Withem "participated" at trial. Id. The supreme court
reversed the court of appeals, holding that Withem had not participated at trial. Id.
498. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.145(a) (Vernon 1993). See also Texas State Bd. of
Dental Exam'rs v. Sizemore, 759 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex. 1988).
499. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2001.144 & .146(c) (Vernon 1993).
500. Id. § 2001.176(a) (Vernon 1993).
501. See id. § 2001.142(b) (Vernon 1993).




505. 925 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
506. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4548h, § 3(a) (Vernon 1981).
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of the order, while, under the APA, he cannot appeal the revocation or-
der until his motion for rehearing is overruled, which, as discussed above,
can be as late as forty-five days after the date of the order.
In Simmons, the dentist/appellant tried to comply with both the DPA
and APA by filing a motion for rehearing with the Board and, while his
motion was pending, seeking judicial review in district court.507 He re-
quested the district court to stay his judicial proceeding until either the
Board had ruled on his motion for rehearing, or the motion was over-
ruled by operation of law.50 8 Although the trial court stayed the proceed-
ing, the court refused to reinstate Simmons' action for judicial review
after the motion for rehearing was overruled by operation of law.50 9 The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.5 10
The supreme court reversed, holding that a conflict existed between the
DPA and the APA and that, despite the conflict, Simmons had "made
every attempt to comply with both."' 511 As a result, the court concluded,
Simmons' motion to reinstate substantially satisfied the judicial-review
requirements of the APA and invoked the trial court's appellate
jurisdiction.512
2. Filing the Administrative Record
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the party seeking judicial re-
view of an administrative order "shall offer, and the reviewing court shall
admit, the state agency record into evidence as an exhibit." 513 Until the
Texas Supreme Court's recent decision in Nueces Canyon Consolidated
Independent School District v. Central Education Agency,514 the Austin
Court of Appeals consistently interpreted this language to dictate that the
exclusive procedure for bringing the agency record before reviewing
courts, including courts of appeals, is by timely filing it as part of the
statement of facts. 515 The supreme court disagrees, holding in Nueces
507. 925 S.W.2d at 652.
508. Id. at 652-53.
509. Id. at 653.
510. Id.
511. Id. at 654.
512. Notably, not all administrative acts or codes conflict with the ADA in this regard.
For example, as noted by the supreme court in Simmons, under the Alcoholic Beverage
Code, an aggrieved party must appeal within thirty days after an agency order becomesfinal. 925 S.W.2d at 653; TEx, ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.67(b)(1), 61.34(a) (Vernon
1977 & 1987). In contrast, the DPA requires the aggrieved dentist to file his appeal within
thirty days from the service of notice of the Board of Dental Examiners. TEX. REV. CTV.
STAT. ANN. art. 4548h, § 3(a) (Vernon 1981). Thus, an aggrieved party seeking review of
an agency order under the Alcoholic Beverage Code who files an appeal before his motion
for rehearing is overruled never invokes the district court's jurisdiction because the agency
order is not appealable until the motion for rehearing is overruled. See Lindsay v. Sterling,
690 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1985).
513. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.175(d) (Vernon 1993).
514. 917 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
515. See, e.g., Everett v. Texas Educ. Agency, 860 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. App.-Austin
1993, no writ); Snead v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Exam'rs, 753 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1988, no writ). Other courts of appeals have disagreed with the Austin
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Canyon that, although an administrative record must be offered into evi-
dence at the trial court for an appeal to be brought under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, "an appellant may bring an administrative record in
an appeal governed by the Administrative Procedure Act to an appellate
court as part of a statement of facts or transcript so long as a court re-
porter's certificate or other evidence demonstrates that the trial court ad-
mitted the record. '516
Notably, however, the supreme court expressly stated in Nueces Can-
yon that, although the method of transmitting the administrative record
to the courts of appeals may be by its inclusion in the statement of facts
or the transcript, the administrative record must be offered into evidence
at the trial court in an appeal for judicial review brought under the
APA.517 Therefore, an administrative record that is transmitted as part of
the transcript by virtue of having been simply filed with the district court
cannot be considered by the court of appeals. 518 As a result, although the
method of transmitting the record via the transcript is now permitted, the
administrative record will only be considered by the court of appeals if it
was admitted into evidence by the trial court.519
XV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT GROUNDS NOT GRANTED BY
TRIAL COURT
In Cincinnati Life Insurance Co. v. Cates,520 the Texas Supreme Court
expanded the scope of appellate review of summary judgments. Prior to
Cincinnati Life, the supreme court and the courts of appeals limited their
consideration of summary judgments granted on specific grounds to the
grounds upon which the trial court granted summary judgment.52' In
Court of Appeals position on this issue. See Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Raffaelli, 905
S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, no writ).
516. 917 S.W.2d at 776 (emphasis added). In Fetchin v. Meno, 916 S.W.2d 961 (Tex.
1996) (per curiam), the supreme court similarly reversed the Austin Court of Appeals'
refusal to review two other administrative appeals on the basis that the administrative rec-
ord was filed as part of the transcript instead of the statement of facts. Id. at 962.
517. 917 S.W.2d at 776.
518. Texas Health Enters., Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Health, 925 S.W.2d 750, 755 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1996, writ requested).
519. Id.
520. 927 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1996).
521. Id. at 625 (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex.
1993) (plurality opinion); Delaney v. University of Houston, 835 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1992);
Maley v. 7111 Southwest Freeway, Inc., 843 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, writ denied); In re Estate of Canales, 837 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1992, no writ)). However, the supreme court carefully noted that its opinion does
not conflict with any of its prior opinions. Cincinnati Life, 927 S.W.2d at 626. The court
pointed out that State Farm was a plurality opinion with no binding precedential value on
the court and the additional summary judgment grounds in Delaney were not addressed by
the court because the record was not well developed on those issues, not because the court
of appeals had no authority to consider grounds not ruled on by the trial court. Cincinnati
Life, 927 S.W.2d at 626. The court further distinguished Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830
S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1992), and City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671(Tex. 1979), noting that "neither case dealt with whether the trial court must actually rule
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Cincinnati Life, the supreme court expanded appellate review of sum-
mary judgments granted on specific grounds to include the review of sum-
mary judgment grounds asserted but not made the basis of the summary
judgment.522
In support of its holding, the supreme court stated the general rule
that, in an appeal from a summary judgment, "issues an appellate court
may review are those the movant actually presented to the trial court. '523
Additionally, nothing in the rules of civil or appellate procedure limits
the scope of appellate review. Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure does not prohibit an appellate court from affirming a summary
judgment on other grounds properly raised before the trial court when
the trial court grants summary judgment on fewer than all grounds as-
serted.524 Moreover, the rules of appellate procedure expressly "give ap-
pellate courts the authority, when reviewing judgments of lower courts, to
render the judgment or decree that the court below should have ren-
dered. '5 25 As a result, the court held, courts of appeals (1) "should con-
sider all summary judgment grounds the trial court rules on and the
movant preserves for appellate review that are necessary for final disposi-
on each summary judgment ground for the appellate court to have authority to consider
the ground on appeal." Cincinnati Life, 927 S.W.2d at 626.
522. 927 S.W.2d at 624-25.
523. Id. at 625.
524. Id. Rule 166a(c) states, in part: "Issues not expressly presented to the trial court
by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds
for reversal." TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
525. Cincinnati Life, 927 S.W.2d at 625 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 80(b), 81(c), 180, 182(a)).
Rule 80(b) states:
The court of appeals may: (1) affirm the judgment of the court below, (2)
modify the judgment of the court below by correcting or reforming it, (3)
reverse the judgment of the court below and dismiss the case or render thejudgment or decree that the court below should have rendered, or (4) reverse
the judgment of the court below and remand the case for further
proceedings.
TEX. R. App. P. 80(b). Rule 81(c) states:
When the judgment or decree of the court below shall be reversed, the court
shall proceed to render such judgment or decree as the court below should
have rendered, except when it is necessary to remand to the court below for
further proceedings.
TEX. R. App. P. 81(c). Rule 180 states:
In each cause, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the judgment of the
court of appeals, or reverse and render such judgment as the court of appeals
should have rendered, or remand the cause to the court of appeals, or re-
verse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court, if it shall appear
that the justice of the cause demands another trial.
TEX. R. App. P. 180. Rule 182(a) states:
Whenever the Supreme Court shall affirm the judgment or decree of the trial
court or the court of appeals, or proceeds to modify the judgment and to
render such judgment or decree against the appellant in the court of appeals
as should have been rendered by the trial court or the court of appeals, it
shall render judgment against the appellant and the sureties upon his super-
sedeas bond, if any, for the performance of said judgment or decree, and
shall make such disposition of the costs as the court shall deem proper, ren-
dering judgment against the appellant or petitioner and the sureties on his
appeal or supersedeas bond, if any, for such costs as are taxed against him.
TEx. R. App. P. 182(a).
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tion of the appeal when reviewing a summary judgment," and (2) "may
consider other grounds that the movant preserved for review and [the]
trial court did not rule on in the interest of judicial economy. '526
B. REVIEW OF EVIDENCE OF PUNITIVE AND DTPA
ADDITIONAL DAMAGES
During the Survey period, the supreme court emphasized its holding in
Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel.527 Specifically, when affirming a
punitive damages award over a challenge that it is based on insufficient
evidence or is against the great weight and preponderance of the evi-
dence, the court of appeals is required to detail all the relevant evidence
and explain why that evidence "supports or does not support the punitive
damages award" in light of the Alamo National Bank v. Kraus528 fac-
tors.529 The supreme court also affirmed its holding in Haynes & Boone
v. Bowser Bouldin, Ltd.530 that the Kraus review must be applied to an
award of additional damages under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Con-
sumer Protection Act.53'
C. REVIEW OF FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY POINTS
The supreme court reaffirmed that, in reviewing a factual sufficiency
point, the court of appeals "must weigh all of the evidence in the rec-
ord. ' 532 This is so, regardless of whether the point attacks a trial court
fact finding or a jury verdict-the two are reviewed on appeal under the
same legal standards.5 33 In overturning a finding of fact, the court of ap-
peals must "clearly state why the ... finding is fLctually insufficient or is
so against the great weight and preponderance as to be manifestly un-
just."534 A "perfunctory" review of the evidence will not suffice. 535
D. REVIEW OF JURY MISCONDUCT
In Pharo v. Chambers County, Texas,536 the supreme court clarified
that the determination of whether jury misconduct occurred is a question
of fact for the trial court and, if there is conflicting evidence on the issue,
526. Cincinnati Life, 927 S.W.2d at 626 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 90(a)). Rule 90(a) states:
"The court of appeals shall hand down a written opinion which shall be as brief as practica-
ble but which shall address every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the
appeal. Where the issues are clearly settled, the court shall write a brief memorandum
opinion." TEX. R. App. P. 90(a).
527. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
528. 616 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1981).
529. Ellis County State Bank v. Keever, 915 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam).
530. 896 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1995).
531. Leonard & Harral Packing Co. v. Ward, 937 S.W.2d 425 (1996) (per curiam); see
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1997).
532. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
533. Id.
534. Id. (quoting Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986)).
535. Id.
536. 922 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1996).
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the trial court's finding must be upheld on appeal. 537 Stated another way,
"the trial court's determination as to whether jury misconduct occurred
'is ordinarily binding on the reviewing courts and will be reversed only
where a clear abuse of discretion is shown.' ' 538
XVI. DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
A. REMAND FOR NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES ONLY
A court of appeals that remands a case for a new trial solely on the
issue of unliquidated damages where liability is contested exceeds its au-
thority under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and is subject to
reversal by the supreme court.539 Under the Rules, if a trial court's error
affects only a part of the case and that part is "clearly separable without
unfairness to the parties," the court of appeals may reverse the judgment
only as to that part affected by the error.540 The court may not, however,
order a separate trial on unliquidated damages alone "if liability issues
are contested."'541
B. TRIAL COURT REFUSAL TO ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
If a trial court commits harmful error by failing to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law after timely request and reminder, 42 should the
court of appeals reverse the case and remand for a new trial, or stay the
proceedings and order the trial judge to file findings and conclusions?
The El Paso Court of Appeals faced this issue in Brooks v. Housing Au-
thority.543 The court determined that, under the circumstances of that
case, the error was properly remedied by abating the appeal and remand-
537. Id. at 948.
538. Id. (quoting State v. Wair, 351 S.W.2d 878, 878 (Tex. 1961)).
539. Redman Homes, Inc. v. Ivy, 920 S.W.2d 664, 669 (Tex. 1996); TEX. R. App. P.
81(b)(1).
540. TEX. R. App. P. 81(b)(1).
541. Redman, 920 S.W.2d at 669. Rule 81(b)(1) states, in full:
(1) Civil Cases. No judgment shall be reversed on appeal and a new trial
ordered in any cause on the ground that the trial court has committed an
error of law in the course of the trial, unless the appellate court shall be of
the opinion that the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the
rights of the appellant as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably
did cause rendition of an improper judgment in the case, or was such as prob-
ably prevented the appellant from making a proper presentation of the case
to the appellate court; and if it appears to the court that the error affects a
part only of the matter in controversy and that such part is clearly separable
without unfairness to the parties, the judgment shall only be reversed and a
new trial ordered as to that part affected by such error, provided that a sepa-
rate trial on unliquidated damages alone shall not be ordered if liability is-
sues are contested.
TEX. R. App. P. 81(b)(1).
542. "A trial court's failure to make findings is not harmful error if 'the record before
the appellate court affirmatively shows that the complaining party suffered no injury."'
Tenery v. Tenery, 932 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
543. 926 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
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ing for the trial court to file findings and conclusions. 544
In reaching this conclusion, the El Paso court reviewed the position
taken by the supreme court on this issue over the years, including the
court's opinion in Cherne Industries, Inc. v. Magallanes.545 In Cherne In-
dustries, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals
and remanded to that court with instructions for it to direct the trial court
to correct its error pursuant to Rule 81(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure. 546 Having reviewed the supreme court's decision in Cherne,
the appeals court in Brooks held that, "whenever possible, appellate
courts should attempt to remedy the absence of findings and conclusions
by abating the appeal and remanding to the trial judge for entry of find-
ings and conclusions, so that the appeal can be handled in the normal
manner.,
547
Significantly, four months after the El Paso court's opinion in Brooks,
the supreme court in Tenery v. Tenery548 found that a trial court's failure
to file findings and conclusions was harmful error, reversed the judgment
of the court of appeals, and remanded the case to the court of appeals
"with instructions for it to direct the trial court to correct its error under
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81(a)." 549 Although the supreme
court in Tenery did not expressly discuss the abatement/new trial issue,
the court apparently agrees with the El Paso Court of Appeals that a trial
court's failure to file findings and conclusions should be remedied by
abating the appeal and remanding to the trial court for entry of findings
and conclusions. 550
C. REMITr1TUR IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Texas Supreme Court's decisions are limited by a paramount rule:
it can consider only questions of law.5 51 As a result, even if the supreme
court can accept remittitur in a case (which is currently an unresolved
544. Id. at 321.
545. 763 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1989).
546. Cherne, 763 S.W.2d at 773. Rule 81(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides:
No Reversal if Error Remediable. If the erroneous action or failure or re-
fusal of the trial judge to act shall prevent the proper presentation of a cause
to the court of appeals, and be such as may be corrected by the judge of the
trial court, then the judgment shall not be reversed for such error, but the
appellate court shall direct the said judge to correct the error, and thereafter
the court of appeals shall proceed as if such erroneous action or failure to act
had not occurred.
TEx. R. App. P. 81(a).
547. 926 S.W.2d at 321.
548. 932 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
549. Id. at 30.
550. As explained by the court in Brooks, however, under some circumstances, abate-
ment may not be an appropriate remedy. 926 S.W.2d at 321. For example, if the trial court
cannot forward findings and conclusions to the court of appeals "due to loss of the record,
problems with memory, passage of time, or other inescapable difficulties," reversal and
remand for a new trial is a proper remedy. Id.
551. Redman, 920 S.W.2d at 669.
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issue), remittitur is not an available remedy in the Texas Supreme Court
unless the evidence establishes an amount of damages as a matter of
law.552
XVII. REHEARING EN BANC
During the Survey period, the supreme court clarified that while the
Texas Constitution, Government Code and rules of appellate procedure
require that for an appellate court decision to be valid, a majority of the
members of an en banc court of appeals must join in the court's opinion
and judgment in a case submitted en banc, a majority is not required to
deny a motion for rehearing.553 The Texas Constitution states that "[t]he
concurrence of a majority of the judges sitting in a section is necessary to
decide a case."' 554 The Government Code states that "[w]hen convened
en banc, a majority of the membership of the court constitutes a quorum
and the concurrence of a majority of the court sitting en banc is necessary
for a decision." 555 The rules of appellate procedure provide that "[w]here
a case is submitted to an en banc court, whether on motion for rehearing
or otherwise, a majority of the membership of the court shall constitute a
quorum and the concurrence of a majority of the court sitting en banc
shall be necessary to a decision. '556 Holding that a motion for rehearing
is not "a case" within the meaning of the constitutional provision or "a
decision" within the meaning of the Government Code or Rule 79 be-
cause those provisions refer to a decision on "the merits of the case," the
Saenz court concluded that if the vote on a motion for rehearing or mo-
tion for rehearing en banc is evenly divided, "there is no 'decision'
and the motion fails." 557
552. Id. In Redman, the supreme court upheld the court of appeals' finding that the
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's actual damages award. Redman, 920 S.W.2d
at 669. The court of appeals, however, erred in remanding for a new trial only the issue of
damages, when, under Rule 81(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, it should
have remanded the entire case. Id. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals on
this basis. Id. In an attempt to escape the consequences of the court of appeals' error in
this regard, the respondents attempted to tender a voluntary remittitur to the supreme
court. Id. The supreme court rejected the remittitur since, although there was some evi-
dence to support the lesser amount of damages, the evidence did not establish the lesser
amount as a matter of law. Id.
553. Saenz v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex. 1996).
554. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1891, amended 1978).
555. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.223(b) (Vernon 1988).
556. TEX. R. App. P. 79(d). In the event a majority of the justices of the court sitting en
banc cannot concur in a decision because they are equally divided, Rule 79(d) further
provides that
such fact shall be certified to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who
may temporarily assign a justice of another court of appeals or a qualified
retired justice to participate in the decision of the case pursuant to law. The
reconstituted en banc court may order the case reargued, at its discretion.
Id.
557. Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 612. The court also held that, with respect to the require-
ment that a majority of the court sitting en banc join in the court's opinion and judgment in
a case submitted en banc, the later addition of a new justice of the court cannot disturb an
earlier vote on a case unless the court agrees to rehear the case. Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 612.
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